THE Nation

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The Shape of Things

WE CANNOT SHARE THE *WALL STREET Journal's* satisfaction with Mr. Roosevelt's new budget. It cuts aid to farmers, the unemployed, and youth by more than a billion dollars, and it increases our already enormous arms expenditures to more than $1,800,000,000. By the President's own estimate, his new relief appropriations will reduce the number on the WPA rolls to 500,000 less than were employed even under the Woodrum bill. A faltering war boom has done little to reduce the standing army of unemployed or to dent the ranks of youth who cannot find a job. Increased arms expenditures will of course provide some new employment, but they represent the most expensive form of "work relief," for every dollar that will feed the hungry by this route must first feed the steel trust, the shipbuilding trust, the chemical trust, and the munitions makers. Mr. Roosevelt asks for a half-billion dollars in new taxes and hopes they will not be of a kind to cut into consumption, but the sales tax is sure to raise its head again at this session. It is good to see that Mr. Roosevelt asks that capacity to pay be the basis of new taxation. The President's budget, if adopted, will give us a deficit $1,760,000,000 below that of the present fiscal year, but the deficit will still be more than $2,000,000,000. The size of that deficit is the fiscal reflection of the chronic unemployment from which we seem to be suffering, and for which the New Deal—for all its reforms—has yet to find a remedy.

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IN 1932 MR. ROOSEVELT CALLED HOOVER "spendthrift" because he had piled up a deficit of $5,000,000,000; now the President wants it understood that *only* $19,000,000,000 of our public debt of $42,000,000,000 is due to his own accumulated deficit. Much is made of the comparison—and of Mr. Roosevelt's inconsistency—by the New York *Times* and other critics of the Administration. But the fact is that every country in the world has been forced to abandon deflationary policies and to spend in an effort to combat depression. Britain, the homeland of classical economics and the chief pillar of financial conservatism, was the first great power to do so, and this fact is itself of historic significance. The contrast between the measures Mr. Roosevelt advocated in 1932 and those he has since applied testifies to the "quarterback" flexibility of mind on which he has always prided himself. In a larger context the contrast reflects the world trend to state domination of economic life; and the hope of reversing it, with a new war under way, is fantastic. The real need is to recognize the trend, the breakdown of private capitalism that brought it about, and the new policies for which it calls. We still cling to "bootstrap economics," but we cannot go on spending forever. The next step must be for the government to take over certain sectors of private enterprise so that its expenditures may be poured into productive channels rather than into the bottomless pit of subsidizing consumption.

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FRANK MURPHY IS A GREAT IMPROVEMENT over Pierce Butler, and there will be general satisfaction with his nomination to the Supreme Court. As a young attorney, as a local judge in Detroit, and later as Governor of Michigan, Murphy demonstrated sympathy with labor and courage in expressing it. His recent address in this city before the civil-liberties conference held under the auspices of the American Civil Liberties Union was not particularly impressive, and his references to A. Mitchell Palmer were rather disturbing. On the debit side, too, are Murphy's praise of J. Edgar Hoover and his assurance that the FBI can never become an OGPU. Nevertheless, we believe that on the court, removed from political pressures, Murphy's liberalism will wear well. It is always hard to judge a Supreme Court nominee in advance; sometimes conservatives grow more liberal on the bench; sometimes genuine progressives, up against new issues, sag badly as they grow older. This was the case with Taney. We wish the new Justice well. Jackson's elevation to the Attorney Generalship and Francis Biddle's appointment as Solicitor General will meet with approval. Biddle's willingness to resign from the old Labor Board rather than kotow to Hearst in the Jennings case did him honor, and his new appointment is the President's amends for that disgraceful episode. We are only sorry to see Biddle leave the United States Circuit Court; his position there was, we think, more important if less politically strategic than that of Solicitor General.

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THE READING OF THE WAGNER ACT BY A unanimous Supreme Court in the Longshoremen's, Falk, and Consumers' Power cases is admirably literal. The law says that only "final orders" of the board are reviewable by the courts. The provision was the fruit of bitter experience under the old Labor Board, when employers could tangle proceedings interminably by running into court for a restraining order at every step. In other days the Supreme Court was accustomed to swathe such plain statutory mandates in obfuscation—and do as it pleased. But Justice Stone in the first and last of these three cases exercises that "self-restraint" he so bitterly recommended to his colleagues in the first AAA case, and declares that it is up to "Congress and not the courts" to change the law. What judicial interference in earlier stages of the Labor Board's work can do is made clear by Justice Black in the Falk decision. There a circuit court amended a Labor Board order for an election so as to add a company union to the ballot and relieve the employer from the necessity of posting notices announcing that the company had been ordered to discontinue its support of that union. This is the type of judicial "amendment" that has reduced to impotence so many of our administrative agencies—notably in the field of utility regulation. Employers and rival unions have their day in court when a final order is issued. That is ample.

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WE HOPE THAT LIBERALS IN WASHINGTON and elsewhere will get the point of the subdued report issued by the Dies committee. As Kenneth Crawford points out on another page, the liberals on the committee were permitted to rewrite the original report because the reactionary majority wants to keep the show going at all costs. They are confident that they can resume control if and when a new appropriation is granted. There has not been the slightest change of heart or objective; Mr. Dies has shrewdly retreated to lay the groundwork for a new offensive. That offensive will, as before, be directed against the New Deal. There is only one way to avert that development: New Dealers must expose the fraud involved in the report and fight to end the life of a committee which has already done an incalculable amount of damage.

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THE SMITH HIT-AND-RUN INVESTIGATION OF the National Labor Relations Board, about to resume its hearings as we went to press, will this time dish up some "revelations" about the board's employment of young college graduates. Judged by its past conduct, the Smith committee could learn a great deal even from young college graduates about the fair and proper way to run a Congressional inquiry. So far it has served only as a sounding-board for grudges and a source of unfair and one-sided news stories which have been used as the basis for a drive to turn the Wagner Act into a means of oppressing rather than helping labor. Inspired stories that Democratic leadership in Congress will seek to appease business by revising the law into a replica of railroad labor legislation do not impress us. The mechanism for adjusting disputes over wages and hours in the highly organized railroad industry is no model for businesses in which the right of organization has yet to be won. The chief objection to the Wagner Act is still an elementary one—it encourages workers to organize. That objection can only be eliminated by eliminating the act, and elimination smells no sweeter when termed amendment. The board's latest report is encouraging. During the last fiscal year the number of strikes called to obtain the right to organize decreased by two-thirds.

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TWO WEEKS AGO ONE JAMES C. PETRILLO, who is not only head of the Chicago Federation of Musicians but a strong-arm politician, was reported to have forced deletion of the name of John L. Lewis from three shows in that city. John L.'s name has been put back, and two columnists have now "revealed" that it was all a trick devised by George White to get publicity for his "Scandals." Maybe so, but the whole story sounds more like a genuine essay in censorship by Petrillo than a risky publicity sketch by White. Meanwhile on the national stage the Federation of Musicians is putting on a show of its own. Two years ago the federation forced through a demand that radio broadcasters spend some $1,500,000 for the labor of musicians, whether they need them or not. This year the ante has been raised to $3,000,000. Since the broadcasters are balking, the union has asked its locals throughout the country to refrain from signing contracts with broadcasters, but has given them permission to let their members work without written agreements, the object being to make constant the threat of a strike that would tie up the broadcasting industry. This seems to us a highly irregular procedure. The interests of musicians should be defended, but not by methods which discredit collective bargaining and in the end hurt rather than help the rank and file of labor.

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WITH A MINIMUM OF RHETORIC, LEHMAN of New York continues to press forward with a progressive program that should be a model to other governors. In his quiet and methodical way this ex-banker has achieved far more than was accomplished by either Smith or Roosevelt in liberal legislation. Outstanding in his proposals are his suggestions for the abolition of the "blue-ribbon jury," an undemocratic device if there ever

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was one, and for the outlawing of wire-tapping. He asks an amendment to make state development and ownership of water-power resources a reality, particularly in regard to the St. Lawrence River. He calls attention to the extraordinary loophole in utility regulation that makes it unnecessary for the companies to reveal their depreciation accounts. He wants to make it easier to get rid of corrupt judges and corrupt municipal officials. He asks an amendment to force reapportionment. He promises to speed up public housing. He proposes to forbid discrimination against the Negro by labor unions and all businesses affected with a public interest. How much the Governor can do depends upon the Republicans, who control the Assembly. We indorse the Governor's defense of his Labor Relations Board but deplore his inability to see that in the milk field the farm cooperatives he praises are undemocratic company unions, that milk regulation under state as under federal law is still cut to suit the needs of the two big milk combines, and that the statewide milk-advertising campaign is the device of milk-trust lobbyists to shut the mouths of the newspapers.

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PROSPECTS FOR AN IMMEDIATE EMBARGO ON the export of war supplies to Japan upon the expiration of the trade treaty on January 26 are not considered very favorable in Washington. Certain business interests have apparently exerted sufficient pressure to prevent the stoppage of their lucrative war trade. A much better chance is seen for the adoption of discriminatory measures against growing imports from Japan. Such a movement would have the strong support of American textile interests, which have been alarmed at the sudden jump in imports of Japanese textiles. The President already has the power to take action against Japanese imports as soon as the trade treaty has expired. He can apply the 10 per cent countervailing duty on Japanese imports suspended by President Grant in 1872. If this fails to bring Japan to terms he can increase the duty on the ground that Japan subsidizes its exports to the United States—similar action has already been taken against German imports. Under the 1934 Tariff Act he has the power to ban Japanese imports altogether if Japan continues to discriminate against American trade in the occupied areas of China. Individuals and groups interested in checking Japanese aggression and preserving China's independence should throw themselves unreservedly behind this movement while continuing their drive for an export embargo. For a reduction in Japanese imports would be just as effective in stopping Japan under present conditions as a ban on exports. Japan's gold and foreign-exchange reserves are completely exhausted. Without sales of silk, textiles, and other products to this country it cannot hope to obtain the foreign exchange necessary for the continued purchase of war materials.

GREAT BRITAIN HAS PAID LITTLE HEED TO the series of protests delivered by our State Department in recent weeks against the infringement of American neutral rights on the high seas. Although some interference with American shipping may be regarded as inevitable in this war, the particular infringements singled out for protest are of a type that it is difficult for a neutral to tolerate, no matter how sympathetic it may be with Allied war aims. The seizure of American mails destined for neutral countries violates the eleventh Hague convention without appearing to serve any legitimate British war purpose. Similarly, the action of the British navy in taking the American merchant ship Mormacson into the European war zone in violation of the Neutrality Act was a needless flouting of American sentiment. Only slightly less objectionable was the detention of the American liner Manhattan, bound for a neutral port. The impossibility of enforcing neutral rights against a sea power like Great Britain in a major conflict was demonstrated in the last war. But the State Department is in an unassailable position in demanding full compensation for all losses incurred as a result of Great Britain's illegal actions.

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THE PRESIDENT'S NEW YEAR DIPLOMATIC appointments range all the way from excellent to ridiculous. Whole-hearted approval can be given to the choice of George Messersmith as ambassador to Cuba. During recent years American policy toward Cuba has been marked by consistent blundering, and it is difficult to think of anyone whom we could better trust to rectify these mistakes than Mr. Messersmith. At the other extreme is the selection of James H. R. Cromwell, Doris Duke's amateur economist, as minister to Canada. Mr. Cromwell's sole qualification for the post seems to be personal friendship with the President and Mayor "I-Am-the-Law" Hague of Jersey City. Scarcely more encouraging is the report that former Governor George H. Earle of Pennsylvania will be named minister to Ireland, replacing John Cudahy, who has been moved to Belgium. While Mr. Earle's record as minister to Austria was generally considered satisfactory, his subsequent acts in Pennsylvania scarcely confirmed his liberal reputation. Little criticism will be made of the promotion of Breckinridge Long, former ambassador to Italy, to the post vacated by Mr. Messersmith in the State Department. But the filling of Mr. Messersmith's shoes should challenge the abilities even of a diplomat with as much experience as Mr. Long.

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CORRECTION: Through an unfortunate error in transcription the name of Spaulding Frazer appeared as Frazier Spaulding in *The Nation's* Honor Roll, which was printed in our issue of last week.

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Seeking a Flank

COMPLETE inactivity continues on the western front, and there has been little news recently of the war at sea. Either because of weather conditions or because of more effective counter-measures, the German effort to smash the British blockade seems to have been relaxed. It is hardly conceivable, however, that this passivity can continue for many weeks.

So far as land warfare is concerned, the difficulties of a break-through by either side appear more formidable than ever. Through these winter months, while front-line activity has been limited to skirmishes, the work of strengthening and deepening both the Maginot and Siegfried lines has apparently continued feverishly. Hence the possibility of a military decision has been still further reduced unless one side or the other succeeds in opening up a flank. It is recognition of this fact that has caused the recent heightened tension in neutral countries and led to renewed activity on the diplomatic front.

The most sensational development has been the negotiations between the Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Csaky and Count Ciano of Italy. After a long conference during the week-end Count Csaky returned suddenly to Budapest instead of remaining in Italy for a vacation as originally planned. The reasons for this move are still unknown, but a "high authority" in the Hungarian capital has been quoted as saying that Italy and Hungary had agreed on a defensive military alliance which would assure Hungary of support against invasion by Germany and Russia. If this report proves correct, it will put an entirely new complexion on the situation in Southeastern Europe. For it would mean that Italy had recognized that neither Germany nor Russia could take any offensive action in the Balkans without at least the tacit consent of the other, and that in order to oppose effectively any advance by the Soviets into the region it would have to be prepared to break with its former axis partner.

This news coincides with a recrudescence of Balkan rumors and suggests that some of them may be well founded. These include reports that Germany is extremely dissatisfied with the amount of economic support received from Rumania and is considering bringing military pressure to bear. Another story current is that Berlin is worried by plans of the Allies and Turkey for constructing an eastern front and would like to establish a good defensive position in the Balkans. Even if these reports are entirely false, they reflect the growing fear in Southeastern Europe that deadlock elsewhere may bring the tides of war sweeping over its borders. Certainly Rumania's mistrust of Russia's intentions has not been allayed, although its dread of the Red Army seems to have been diminished by Finland's resistance. Consequently, while not long ago it was said that in the event of a Russian attack Bessarabia would be abandoned, more troops have now been moved into that region and King Carol has announced it will be defended to the last.

Another factor in the situation is the appalling disaster caused by earthquakes and floods in northern Anatolia. To what extent this has temporarily weakened Turkey in a military sense is not clear. Obviously the disorganization of economic life and transport must have an adverse bearing on its defensive preparations, and the cost of reconstruction will be a heavy burden on the country's limited resources. Hence if Russia or Germany or both were contemplating an attack on Turkey's ally, Rumania, the present time might seem propitious.

If the tortuous relations of Moscow and Berlin are a threat to the Balkans, they are even more dangerous to the Scandinavian countries. Should the Russian attack on Finland succeed—and despite the Finns' remarkable resistance they must be overwhelmed by numbers unless outside aid arrives—Norway and Sweden would seem destined to be the next victims. In fact, there is a widespread belief in Scandinavia that Germany and Russia have already agreed on a plan to carve them up. Yet if they openly move to Finland's assistance they fear that Germany might seize the opportunity to attack. Britain and France are sending planes and munitions to Finland but cannot give more substantial aid, even if otherwise prepared to do so, while Norway and Sweden remain officially neutral, for the Finns' only contact with the West is through those countries.

The dilemma of the Scandinavian states has been sharpened by recent harsh warnings issued in Berlin. According to the German press, the Allies are attempting to drag the Northern countries into the war, and dire consequences are threatened if they fail to remain strictly neutral. Actually, while there is no reason to suppose that the Allies are putting pressure on the Scandinavian countries except in an economic sense, it may well be that the advantages and disadvantages of a northern front are being weighed. It would mean a clear breach with Russia, which so far Paris and London have striven to avoid. Apart from that, the outstanding problem is whether the Allies could spare sufficient men, and transport them speedily enough, to prevent Germany from getting a real grip on the Scandinavian peninsula. For if Germany were able to seize the southern Swedish and Norwegian coasts, the Allies would be immensely handicapped in enforcing the blockade. On the other hand, a firmly established position in the peninsula would give the Allies a chance to break into the Baltic and attack Germany's vulnerable northern coast. Unless, however, their hand is forced, Sweden and Norway will probably try to cling to their neutrality a while longer. They have no illusions about their fate should Germany win the war, but they have understandable misgivings about how much immediate protection they are likely to receive from the Allies.

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Tariffs and Trade Pacts

IN ASKING for an extension of the Trade Agreements Act beyond next June 12, the President has set the stage for what may become the bitterest struggle in the present session of Congress. While the suspension of negotiations with Argentina and Uruguay may tend to draw the teeth of farm opposition to the act, it will hardly change many votes. During recent weeks the Republicans, led by Senators Vandenberg, Borah, and McNary, have been sniping continuously at the Hull trade program. The opposition has grown to such proportions that some Administration supporters are known to have urged the President to accept a compromise under which future trade agreements would be submitted to the Senate for ratification. Although he did not deny that the determination of general tariff policy is a function of Congress, Mr. Roosevelt pointed out that it is desirable in the interest of flexibility to have the trade agreements kept in administrative hands. Had he wished, he could have drawn upon a long and not wholly honorable history of Congressional action in the field of tariffs to show that progress in the elimination of trade barriers seldom comes as a result of Congressional consideration. Whatever an individual Congressman's tariff views may be, he rarely feels free to vote for a reduction of the duty on a product in which his state is vitally interested. And there is no issue on which Congress can waste more time with less satisfactory results than the consideration of specific rates. Giving the Senate power to review the trade agreements might not completely wreck the reciprocal-trade program, but it would open the door to action by pressure groups which could only obstruct the Administration's efforts to break the log jam of international commerce.

Senator Vandenberg, who opposes the traditional Republican tariff policy exemplified by the Hawley-Smoot Act, has suggested what he terms an "elastic" tariff instead of the Hull program. He would base the tariff upon "the difference in the cost of production at home and abroad." Despite Mr. Vandenberg's disavowal, it is difficult to distinguish between his "elastic" tariff and the so-called "scientific" Hawley-Smoot tariff, which stands as one of the major causes of the Great Depression. The theory that our tariff policy can be safely based on differences in the cost of production has plagued Republicans for decades. Carried to its logical conclusion, it would stop all trade in competitive articles. For if a foreign producer cannot turn out goods more cheaply than his American competitor, or has to pay a duty equating his costs with those of American competitors, he obviously cannot afford to ship his article for sale in the United States. And if foreigners are unable to sell here, they have no way of obtaining foreign exchange to buy American goods. Moreover, experience has shown the "cost-of-production" formula to be wholly unworkable in practice. The determination of the relative costs of production of even one article, produced in scores of factories here and in several foreign countries, would tax the full capacities of the Tariff Commission for many months. And even then the result would be far from the "scientific" ideal held up by Senator Vandenberg.

There have been inaccuracies and exaggerations on the other side of the fence also. Mr. Hull and others in the Administration have spoken of the trade agreements as "peace insurance" and have attached a significance to them as economic stimulants which they do not deserve. While it can scarcely be denied that the reciprocal pacts have contributed to more friendly relations between the United States and the countries with which we have signed them, they have done little, if anything, to remove the basic tensions threatening to make for war. Such exaggerations are minor as compared with the opposition's claims that the trade pacts have injured both agriculture and industry, but they have weakened rather than aided the Administration's case. An honest inquiry such as has been proposed by Secretary Hull might not show the pacts to have been as important as is sometimes asserted, but it should make an impregnable case for the extension of the act in its present form. If the pacts have not yielded the results expected, the blame does not rest so much on the act as on the continuous pressure from vested interests—illustrated by the opposition to the proposed Argentine pact—which makes impossible any real reform in our protectionist tariff policy. For despite the valiant efforts of Mr. Hull, the United States still has one of the highest tariffs in the world—a tariff wholly inconsistent with our interests as a creditor country.

The Fall of Hore-Belisha

HORE-BELISHA'S dismissal as Secretary of State for War has resulted in a greater explosion of British public opinion than Mr. Chamberlain may have foreseen. It is not yet clear why he was forced out. Explanations in the British press are varied and in some cases conflicting, while the only official statement available stresses the absence of any division on policy between the Premier and the ex-Minister.

For this reason we must suspend judgment on the merits of the case, lacking as we do the omiscience of Major George Fielding Eliot, who announced in Sunday's New York *Herald Tribune* that differences on questions of strategy between Mr. Hore-Belisha and General Sir Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had become so acute that one or the other had to go. In Major Eliot's opinion, "the Prime Minister's decision does him immeasurable credit" and "is not

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the least of the accomplishments for which future historians will acclaim Neville Chamberlain."

According to the same commentator, Mr. Hore-Belisha's mistaken policy is the result of his close association with Captain Liddell Hart, the well-known military writer and author of "The Defence of Britain." But this association has long been public knowledge, and while the Minister's energetic democratization of the army may be partly due to Captain Hart's influence, he must have differed with his unofficial adviser on the question of the dispatch of a British army to France, opposition to which was the main thesis of "The Defence of Britain." For this fundamental question was settled months ago, and clearly in a way approved by Mr. Hore-Belisha, since otherwise a War Office crisis would have arisen then.

Whatever the cause of Mr. Hore-Belisha's dismissal, its manner was extremely curious. Information has reached us, from a source that makes it impossible to doubt its accuracy, that a few people in London knew two weeks ago that Chamberlain had decided to drop his War Minister. But the latter remained apparently in ignorance until last Thursday, when he was asked to take a definitely inferior position which would have left him outside the War Cabinet.

The storm of indignation in the British press is a tribute to the energy and imagination with which Mr. Hore-Belisha has carried out his job. These qualifications are conspicuously lacking among the majority of the Cabinet, and courage of the kind which he showed in clearing out the Old Guard of generals and attacking the officer-caste system is also rare. Consequently his popularity has grown despite his exhibitionism. The fury aroused by his sacrifice is fanned by the widespread belief that his real "crime" was being an outsider. His successor, Oliver Stanley, son of the Earl of Derby, is very much an "insider." Apart from that, he is an amiable, responsible, well-meaning Tory whose record in half a dozen high offices is one of ineffective mediocrity.

In the ordinary course a minister leaving office has the right to make a personal statement in the House of Commons. Parliament will not meet again until next week unless the Labor Party's demand for an immediate meeting is granted. In any case, public opinion will compel Chamberlain to defend the step he has taken, and it is unlikely to be satisfied with an explanation to a secret session of Parliament. There is a possibility that the crisis will lead to a general airing of the methods by which the war is being carried on, and in some quarters it has been suggested that the outcome may be a complete change in government. Such a change could hardly fail to be for the better since, quite apart from the widespread distrust Mr. Chamberlain inspires, his tendency to surround himself with tired and incompetent old men has proved a serious handicap to Britain's war effort.

The President's Message

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

WHEN I read the President's message I thought, this is a sensational statement of the country's stake in the European war; it will arouse a terrific storm of protest among isolationists. It did nothing of the sort. Soothed perhaps by the President's calm tone and measured language, most of his bitterest Congressional opponents reacted mildly. Several Senators and Congressmen attacked the references to the trade-pact policy, but most of the political comment was favorable and most of it ignored the obvious implication of the message's dominant theme. Newspaper references were also mild and generally beside the main point, although the *Wall Street Journal* and Raymond Clapper in the Scripps papers both expressed disagreement with the President's statements on foreign policy.

Since I agree with Mr. Roosevelt's position I was pleased with the friendly reception it received. But I was puzzled as well. Because he said as plainly as possible that if the totalitarian powers should win the war the world would be "a shabby and dangerous place" for our children to live in—"even though we are a very great and very powerful nation." He said that "with modern weapons and modern conditions" civilized life could not survive a prolonged period of continued warfare like the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He said that "certain freedoms" were essential everywhere if we ourselves are to feel safe. He did not argue from these facts that the United States should send an army to Europe to help defeat the nations that are trying to "dominate the world by concentrated force alone." On the contrary, he specifically said that "the overwhelming majority of our fellow-citizens do not abandon in the slightest their hope and expectation that the United States will not become involved in military participation in these wars." He said that, and I believe he meant it. None the less his words were carefully chosen. Participation other than military is not ruled out; by implication it is approved. What the President did was to express, more clearly than he or any other responsible official has yet done, the momentous opinion that the United States cannot afford to see Britain and France defeated. I agree with this position, and I believe it should be put forward. Only by accepting it without hysteria can we go on to consider its implications.

Pacifists and isolationists will argue that to take sides even mentally—and, still more, materially—is to run the danger of becoming involved militarily as well. Certainly it would be dishonest to pretend that no risks are attached to an open expression of partiality, of whatever sort. A shipment of supplies to Finland carries with it a measure of emotional commitment that might be

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avoided by a cool refusal to help. A loan to Britain, if it were permitted, would combine mercenary and emotional entanglements. Only isolation, far more complete than the neutrality law provides, would prevent acts which bind our interests to those of the Western nations. And even legal isolation cannot freeze human feeling.

Risk of war is not to be dodged. But it can be argued, and I believe it to be true, that American involvement is less likely if continued large-scale material help is sent to the Allied countries. The best chance for preserving American neutrality lies in a quick victory for the Western powers. A long war or a war in which Britain and France face probable defeat will wear down the "hope and expectation" of peace to which Americans still so firmly cling. A long war will increase the danger of a merging of Russian and German forces against the West. A long war will increase the demand for a vindictive peace. Only the early collapse of Hitler's power offers promise of the kind of settlement the world needs.

The President made it plain that he intended to have a hand in securing such a settlement after a totalitarian defeat. He offered as an example of international unity the relationships of the American republics and the success of the Trade Agreements Act in removing restrictive barriers, and he made a strong plea for an extension of the act. He recalled the "blind economic selfishness in most countries, including our own," which after the World War "resulted in a destructive mine field of trade restrictions which blocked the channels of commerce among nations" and contributed to the economic breakdown that led toward the present wars. And he looked ahead to the time when peace would become possible and the United States could "use its influence to open up the trade channels of the world in order that no nation need feel compelled in later days to seek by force of arms what it can well gain by peaceful conference." "For this purpose," he said, "we need the Trade Agreements Act even more than when it was passed. . . . Such an influence will be greatly weakened if this government becomes a dog in the manger of trade selfishness."

I quote this because it shows the direction of the President's thinking. He clearly intends to help bring about peace; if his acts had not already proved this, he indicates such an intention in another part of his message. He believes that an important element in that peace will be a widespread adoption of the principles that govern our trade agreements. This is good enough for a beginning even though it falls far short of the economic collaboration that will be needed after the war. But it is sufficient to prove that the President hopes for a future organization of international relationships in which the United States will play a leading and continuing part. This, too, is an important piece of news.

It is interesting, though perhaps not significant, that the British Ambassador, speaking at Chicago the day after the President delivered his message, made many of the same points. His address was also designed to emphasize the meaning of the European war for America. He too recognized and accepted the determination of this country to stay out. He too talked about trade barriers and stressed the need of a peace that would prevent the economic collapses and conflicts that led to the present struggle. The two addresses were like the British and American faces of a single coin. But while I agreed with most of what Lord Lothian said, I wish he hadn't said it. When the President talks of America's stake in the war, he is fulfilling his duty to his fellow-citizens. When the British Ambassador says the same thing, it is discounted as propaganda, however true it is. Lord Lothian pointed to our "excellent" Ambassador Kennedy, who "is continually explaining to the British people what Americans think." It was a poor example to choose. Both nations would be better off if their ambassadors maintained a decorous diplomatic silence, especially in war time.

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The Real Dies Report

BY KENNETH G. CRAWFORD

Washington, January 8

HAVING run through one dragon, Martin Dies is charging another. As a result of his first gallant fight, he admits, communism in the United States lies prostrate, if not dead. The Russian invasion of Finland might have helped a little, but Dies takes most of the credit for the accomplishment. Since the Dies committee already has achieved its purpose, the virtual destruction of un-Americanism, why should it go on? This problem has been solved by the discovery of another, tougher, uglier dragon, parent of the first. It is atheism or paganism, and the campaign against it is to be a holy war led by Martin Dies.

The ideology of the crusade goes like this: The world is engaged in a fight between Marxist materialism on one side and Christian idealism on the other. The Russian invasion of Finland and the German invasion of Poland are products of Marxism, a term synonymous with atheism. That leaves the Italian invasion of Ethiopia unaccounted for, but it apparently was the exception proving the rule. In the United States the Marxian atheists, disguised as "so-called liberals," are engaged in the materialistic enterprise of supplying the unemployed with food and, in the process, transforming our system of government into a bureaucratic state capitalism.

Dies introduced the new line in the first article of his series in *Liberty*. He developed it in his radio sermon last Saturday night. But it was most fully and clearly set forth in the first draft of his report to Congress. This report, unfortunately, was rewritten by liberal members of the Dies committee and consequently never made public. I say unfortunately because the original document shows that Dies himself and, presumably, a majority of his committee are still determined to destroy the New Deal. The reasonable report that was finally made public was written by a minority of the committee and has created the wholly false impression that Dies and his majority have changed stripe. If their authority and their appropriation are renewed, their efforts to smear Roosevelt liberalism, this time in the name of Christianity itself, will also be renewed.

Consider this paragraph from the conclusions of the suppressed report submitted to the committee by Dies with the recommendation that it be adopted:

> These Marxists who are not attached to the Communist Party or the German-American Bund are characterized, especially in these times, by their constant assaults upon the American economic system, which to them is a pile of "folklore" [as in Thurman Arnold's "Folklore of Capitalism," apparently]. Some of them have received appointments to high government positions, from which vantage points they carry on an incessant attack upon our economic system. Most of them may properly be called milk-and-water Marxists. Nevertheless, by their contempt for the American economic system and their unflagging efforts to discredit it, they serve the ends of those Marxists who feed on the stronger meat of violent revolution. Marxists of all hues and of all degrees of consciousness are seeking to sabotage by slow stages the political and economic system of America in favor of bureaucratic state capitalism.

Jerry Voorhis

And this, according to the rejected report, is how the sabotaging is done:

> First, attacks upon one phase or another of our economic system [reform]. Second, the advocacy of the principle that the government has the duty to support the people [relief]. Third, subtle proposals to regiment agriculture [AAA], labor [NLRB], and industry [SEC and various other government agencies] under some system of planned economy. Fourth, the final abolition of private property in favor of public ownership of basic industries [TVA], and, finally, complete dictatorship [Roosevelt the Kerensky who precedes the dictator].

The report goes on to bolster the Kerensky approach with the flat statement that "we are now witnessing the first stages of this [Marxist-atheist-pagan] campaign."

Thus it becomes apparent that Dies himself and, presumably, the four conservatives who constitute the majority of the committee are still bent on a campaign of New Deal destruction. They permitted the minority members—Jerry Voorhis of California, Joe Casey of Massachusetts, and John Dempsey of New Mexico—to rewrite the report because they wanted something all members of the committee would sign. Dies was anxious to avoid the uncertainties about renewal of his authority that a minority report might entail. Even the House, tolerant as it has been with the antics of the committee, was disgusted with the report of J. B. Matthews, "re-

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search director," that consumer organizations are Communist dominated—except Consumers' Research, the one in which he was long interested. Dies authorized publication of this report without consulting minority members of the committee. He also raised Matthews's pay without bothering to mention it. Matthews was probably the real author not only of the original Dies report but of the chairman's other recent literary productions.

The elaboration of Dies's anti-New Deal prejudices into a new testament of Christianity suggests the Matthews hall mark. Other features of the original report were similarly suggestive. For example, there was the announcement that "Communists have from the beginning of this labor organization [the C. I. O.] wielded the dominant influence in its polices and control." And there was the "shameful and alarming" finding that "563 employees of the federal government could belong to so obviously a Communist-controlled organization" as the League for Peace and Democracy. At one of the committee's meetings Matthews was forced to confess that he could not name a single Communist in the government service, although the original report said some of the shameful 563 were "self-admitted members of the Communist Party." The minority members of the committee eliminated this along with other fanciful "statements of fact."

As everyone now knows, the published report of the committee denounced communism and fascism in uncompromising terms. It was, in fact, considerably harder on the Communists than the original. But it affirmatively rejected the falsehood that liberalism and communism differ only in degree. It defended civil liberties and by implication accused the Dies committee of disrespect for them. It estimated that no more than 1,000,000 of 132,000,000 Americans have embraced subversive doctrines despite widespread suffering during ten depression years. "We owe them," it concluded, "a solution of the economic and social problem of unnecessary poverty in the midst of possible plenty."

The published report, like the unpublished original, recommended further investigation of "un-American activities," but it defined these, as the original did not, as operations in the interest of foreign governments. Such a recommendation seemed so reasonable that it was promptly underwritten by the liberal as well as the conservative press. The New York *Times* expressed the happy thought that the Dies investigation at last had educated Dies. But Dies was in Texas whetting his trusty dragon-lance when the report was written. It is plain that his new dragon is much the same as his old dragon and that it still bears a striking resemblance to the Roosevelt New Deal.

Soviet Russia Today

III. DEATH OF A REVOLUTION

BY LOUIS FISCHER

THE drastic modification in Russia's attitude toward the outside world did not suddenly spring full-blown from the brain of Stalin. It is not the casual whim of one individual. Nor is it merely the product of a new world situation. It has its roots deep in Soviet domestic conditions. The Russo-German pact begins a new era. But it is also a stage in a striking development of the Soviet revolution which started several years ago.

The year 1936 represents a divide in the history of the Bolshevik Revolution. The roots of the rapprochement with the Nazis go back to that year. I trace the new pact with Germany to a divorce between the Soviet leadership and the Soviet people; it became noticeable in 1936.

Up to about 1933 the Soviet regime was laying the industrial foundation of a new Russia, for which the population paid in the form of reduced consumption and harder work. Some did so grumblingly, many patiently. In 1934 and 1935 and in the first half of 1936 life became a bit easier. More goods could be bought in shops. But then the rising curve of consumption began to flatten out. The supply of consumers' commodities in the Soviet Union is today woefully inadequate, and while food is generally plentiful, butter and milk and even articles like cabbage, a staple of Russian diet, are often unobtainable. In this field little progress has been made in the last three years. The deficiency is in part due to military preparations. But it is more adequately explained by the purges and several inherent Soviet economic weaknesses.

Even when he has the money the Soviet citizen faces a knotty problem when he tries to purchase most articles of clothing, especially pants—and there is no socialism without pants—or writing paper, or kitchen utensils, or kerosene for cooking, or a thousand and one items of common daily use. The proof of scarcity is found in the Soviet press: speculators are regularly arrested and sentenced. Speculators flourish only in scarcity. Moreover, factory directors and managers of industries are discharged, purged, or imprisoned for failing to produce efficiently and sufficiently. This usually makes matters worse: less experienced men take the vacated posts. On December 2,

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1939, the New York *Times* carried a report from Moscow about "the famine in consumers' goods" and the "complaints by the Moscow public." The inability to buy necessities is a grave disappointment to the Soviet population, which had hoped that some day, after twenty or more fatiguing years of Soviet economy, life would grow comfortable and easy.

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TRIALS

Simultaneously, another great yearning of the Soviet nation was shattered—the yearning for liberty. The Stalin constitution of 1936 was sincerely intended as a charter of freedom. The enemies of the Bolshevik regime—the kulaks, capitalists, old-style conservative intellectuals—had been eradicated. The loyal folk that remained could be granted more civil rights. That was the conception of the constitution, and its promulgation produced joy throughout the land. The subsequent dejection has been no less intense. For almost immediately restrictions on individuals were drawn tighter, restraint increased, arrests multiplied. The terror that had been directed chiefly against anti-Soviet elements who hated the regime was now aimed at Communists who had made the regime. In 1936, for the first time, occurred wholesale arrests and executions of Communists for political reasons. The trials and purges that followed caused the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of men and women, some shot, some incarcerated, some exiled to frozen and desert wastes. Trials were held not only in Moscow under the limelight. Every city and small town had its trials. The purge extended to every nook of the vast continent which is Russia. Foreign Communists, especially Polish and German refugees, were caught in the huge dragnet.

The basic problem raised by the constitution was the future of the G. P. U. Civil rights, habeas corpus, and all democratic liberties are illusory while a secret police operates with special powers to arrest without proper judicial warrant and to exile and execute without public trial. The Kremlin realized this, and as a preliminary to the issuance of the constitution took measures to curtail the prerogatives of the G. P. U. These measures and their success demonstrated that the G. P. U. was not an independent, omnipotent state within a state but subject to the higher authority of Stalin and his associates.

Then there followed a reversal and setback. In August, 1936, Kamenev and Zinoviev, Lenin's friends, with Stalin members of the triumvirate which ruled after Lenin died, were tried and later executed. The trial of Piatakov, Radek, and several others followed in January, 1937; and in June, 1937, Tukhachevsky and a large group of top-rank Red Army commanders were shot. Many of them were anti-Stalin—though he was the one subject they strangely avoided in their confessions and public statements at the Moscow trials—and some probably had conspired against him. When Soviet Russia was ready for democracy, it got a more draconic dictatorship, because, for one thing, investigations revealed that the country was not as unanimous about the genius and achievements of Stalin as the press seemed to indicate.

The terror of the G. P. U. was now unleashed against all former oppositionists who had or had not recanted, and against numerous others who had never been connected with any opposition. Big figures toppled into prison and oblivion. To have made revolutionary history or to have carried out the Five-Year Plan was no security.

A deadly fear was injected into those who remained. The purges were regrettable not merely from the human point of view and because industry lagged while good industrialists languished in jail; they demoralized the population. The country, for instance, had been taught that Yagoda, the chairman of the G. P. U., was "the flaming sword of the revolution." He was one of the guiding lights of the Soviet government. He had staged the trials of Kamenev and Zinoviev, and of Piatakov, Radek, and the others. But then he himself sat in the dock as an "enemy of the people," and he was executed as an agent of foreign governments. Could he have staged the trials to harm the revolution? Doubts harassed many citizens.

Yagoda was succeeded by Yezhov, and Yezhov in turn became "the flaming sword of the revolution." His picture was displayed in countless offices, factories, and homes. Then he too disappeared in disgrace. Whom could one trust? Whom could one follow?

In 1936 the Soviet government created the rank of marshal and elevated five men to that rank: Voroshilov, Tukhachevsky, Yegorov, Blücher, and Budenny. Children and adults treasured a widely circulated photograph of these heroes of the country. Before long Tukhachevsky was executed for having allegedly wanted a pact with the Nazis, and the children had to cut his face out of the photograph. Then Yegorov had to be excised. And finally Blücher. Today two remain.

Thousands of writers, journalists, Communist officials, party speakers, Bolshevik provincial leaders, and leaders of the youth movement were arrested because, according to the published version, they had been uncovered as anti-Soviet. Then how could the ordinary citizen know whether the man whose article he was reading today, whose speech he was listening to, whose advice he was following, might not be annihilated tomorrow as a foe of the Soviet state? The purges produced a crisis of faith. Since everybody was a potential spy and traitor, everybody distrusted everybody else. This was ruinous to economic activity. Persons in industry knew that promotion brought greater responsibility and greater danger. Some preferred therefore to remain in small jobs. I know of the case of an engineer who chose to be a taxi driver to escape the constant strain of important work in which he might make a mistake that would be interpreted as due to evil

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political intent. Everybody hesitated to talk on serious subjects or to associate with any but a few intimates. There was a premium on frivolity and personal disloyalty. Communists started saying "they" instead of "we" in referring to the regime.

The mass took refuge in indifference and passivity. The Communist Party ceased to count and became a rubber stamp. This made it easy for the leadership to do as it pleased. The people did not have to be considered. It did not have to be prepared for future measures. Steps taken by the government did not have to be explained to it. The Russo-German pact was divulged to an unsuspecting and I am sure horrified Soviet public without preparation or justification.

The Russo-German pact was not the first instance of crude disregard of Bolshevik tradition and Soviet culture. In 1936, having established himself as undisputed dictator, Stalin began making political mistakes. He had accused others of being "dizzy with success." Now he seemed to suffer from the same giddiness. I will limit myself to two mistaken innovations which illustrate the ideological gulf that has developed between top layer and people. In May, 1936, the Soviet government published the draft of an anti-abortion law. Previously abortions had been legal and numerous, and the Bolsheviks, with their usual pendulumism, now swung to the other extreme and wished to proscribe them altogether. But they said to the country: Here is the draft, shoot at it. Do you like it or not? Tell us frankly; this is a democracy. This provoked a nation-wide discussion. Resolutions were adopted in factories condemning the act. The resolutions were published in the press. Women and men wrote letters to the newspapers explaining that under the difficult Soviet housing and living conditions the new provision would work impossible hardships. Overwhelmingly the sentiment, as shown by public statements, was against the draft. Then, after the open debate had raged over the whole country for a month, the government republished the draft as the law, making one or two very minor changes. Independently of the merits or demerits of this piece of legislation, and they are not now germane to my argument, the behavior of the government testified to its contempt and disrespect of the will and wish of the population. It was a slap in the face for the public. It was a political blunder. Citizens shrank back into their unpolitical corners, humiliated and disconsolate.

RUSSIFICATION

Again in 1936 the leadership intensified propaganda, first launched cautiously in 1935, to inculcate patriotism and Russian nationalism. Half the residents of the Soviet Union are not Russians at all, but Ukrainians, Georgians, Turks, Armenians, Mongols, Uzbeks, Tartars, Mordvinians, Chuvashes, and so forth, on down a list of about two hundred nationalities. The bulk of the population had never had any patriotism for czarist Russia and had never been taught any Russian nationalism or even Soviet nationalism by the revolution. The intelligent



RUSSIAN LAKE

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Soviet man or woman who believes in socialism is a patriot of the doctrine and attributes the achievements of the Soviet regime to it rather than to the fact that Russians are applying it on Russian soil. He or she will usually tell you that it is a pity socialism was first tried in Russia, for its chances of success would have been greater in Germany or England or America, which are more civilized and more advanced industrially. The teaching of Lenin was internationalism, and it was accepted by millions of Soviet citizens. I should say that Loyalist Spain, for instance, meant more to Soviet citizens than most events of the last few years inside or outside Russia. Nevertheless, and in defiance of this spirit, Soviet leaders attempted to inoculate the people with Russian nationalism. Prerevolutionary Russian history was rewritten to make it palatable to a new generation, and the works of Pokrovsky, friend of Lenin and famous Communist historian of czarism, were discarded. Peter the Great, reviled for his cruelty by all who read, was refurbished for modern consumption. A whole galaxy of czarist notables appeared from the dustbin of the past, into which a proper assessment of their reactionary deeds had consigned them. Figures like Alexander Nevsky were brought forward out of the mist of the czarist Middle Ages and popularized in the films. Art, literature, and politics received a deepening Russian tinge. "Shors," the latest talkie produced by Dovzhenko, celebrated Soviet Ukrainian director, makes a typical Ukrainian exclaim on his deathbed, "Farewell, Russia and the Ukraine." It is altogether unnatural and un-Soviet for him to say "Farewell, Russia," but it is in tune with the latest Russian patriotism.

Startling official manifestations of Russification appeared for the first time in Soviet history. Soviet policy toward national minorities had always been above criticism by reason of its political wisdom and effectiveness. Racial conflicts were eliminated or reduced to infinitesimal dimensions. As part of this general trend, anti-Semitism became a waning, disappearing phenomenon frowned on and punished by the authorities. The struggle in society, Bolshevism taught, was between classes, not between religions or races.

One of the most attractive features of Soviet endeavor to liberate backward minorities was the introduction of the Latin alphabet among Eastern ethnic groups whose complicated cursive Arabic and other scripts retarded their cultural progress, created a small intellectual aristocracy, and made for a high percentage of illiteracy. Latinization gave a tremendous fillip to popular education, brought Asiatic races closer to Western culture, and documented a decided rupture with the czarist policy of oppressing and Russifying non-Russian populations.

But in 1937 an officially inspired movement away from Latinization set in, and today most of the forty-odd nationalities which adopted the Latin alphabet have decided to drop it or are about to do so and—this is truly amazing—to substitute the Russian Cyrillic alphabet. *Pravda* of October 14, 1939, reported "a meeting of the intelligentsia of the city of Tashkent," in Central Asia, which "unanimously adopted a resolution asking the party and government of Uzbekistan to hasten the transfer to an alphabet based on Russian script." The purpose of this change is "to bring still nearer the cultural wealth of the great Russian people to the peoples of Uzbekistan and considerably to facilitate the study of the great Russian language." The intelligentsia of Tashkent can rest assured that when they demand what Moscow wants to give they will certainly get it. But it is a sharp departure from Soviet practice and principles. And what is this business of the "great Russian nation" and the "great Russian language"? Why are they greater than the Ukrainian or Mongol or Turkish? Such terminology was unknown in the Bolshevik past.

This cultural reaction illumines Molotov's reference on May 31, 1939, to Czechoslovakia as the "large Slav nation." It was the first time a Soviet leader had used "Slav" in such a connection. The political climate in Moscow has grown different. Russianism and Slavism can breathe in it again. Russian expansion and Russian aggression flourish in that atmosphere.

Cultural retrogression, economic stagnation, and political blunders are all interlaced in the pattern of a dictatorship that has become personal. Stalin has sought to eliminate his opponents and every independent source of authority and popularity within the country. He is all-powerful. Yet in his might he is a failure, for socialism is a will-o'-the-wisp. Stalin cannot solve the problems of his country: he seizes other countries. In the same predicament Hitler and Mussolini behaved the same way. A dictator thinks he must have triumphs, and when they elude him at home he seeks them abroad.

FROM MADRID TO OBLIVION

From far and near I watched this evolution of the Soviet revolution with mounting concern. I aired my doubts to Russian, Spanish, and other friends. I never wrote or uttered a word of justification of the Soviet trials and purges. From 1936 on I ceased writing about Soviet internal affairs. While Moscow helped Spain and while the Soviet government was an active factor for world peace, I did not wish to attack the Soviet Union. I had hoped that in Spain Europe might be saved from the present war. It could have been if all the elements now backing Finland had helped struggling democratic Spain against foreign aggression. I had hoped that in Spain Russia would be saved from further reaction. During 1937 and 1938 I often said to Dr. Juan Negrín, the Loyalist Prime Minister, that the Spanish republic had a service to perform to Russia which was greater perhaps than the services Russia was performing for Spain. The Bolshevik ebb might have been reversed in Spain. Instead, Soviet Russia was probably lost there.

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Fascism is the universal enemy of peace and decency. The Soviet government opposed fascism. I refrained from throwing stones at the Soviet government. British and French sins of appeasement which led to this war won Moscow many friends who never approved of the Kremlin dictatorship. Was I, an old friend, to become a public enemy? Spain and China were dear to millions outside their frontiers. These millions had a kindlier feeling for the Soviet Union. I imposed silence on myself. Then Stalin signed his pact with Hitler on August 23, 1939. When it came I recognized it immediately as the ugly fruit of the preceding years of unbolshevik acts within Russia and of the chasm between the will of the leaders and the spirit of the people. I did not have to wait for the invasion of Finland.

Because Spain was so important to the progressive, democratic world I believe it necessary to record that, with one exception, all the leading Soviet officials sent to Spain to help the Loyalists were executed or arrested after their return to Russia. Their names are:

General Goriev, the savior of Madrid—executed.

General Grishin, the first Soviet military chief of staff, who arrived in Madrid in October, 1936, a man of sixty, able, revered by the Spaniards—arrested. He was followed by General Grigorovich, who left Spain in the first half of 1938 to assume a high army post in the Soviet Far East. As Grigory M. Stern, his real name, he is now reported to be in command of a sector of the Finnish-Soviet front. He is the one exception.

General Maximov, Stern's successor in Spain, who helped direct the victorious Ebro offensive in the summer of 1938—arrested.

Marcel Rosenberg, first Soviet ambassador to Loyalist Spain—arrested.

Gaikis, his successor—arrested.

Stashevsky, the Soviet trade representative, an old Polish revolutionist, who not only arranged the Spanish purchases of Russian arms but was Negrín's friendly adviser on many economic problems—arrested.

Antonov Avseyenko, Soviet consul general in Catalonia, who led the assault on the Winter Palace in Petrograd in 1917—arrested.

Michail Koltsov, *Pravda* correspondent in Spain throughout the war, who had reported personally to Stalin and Voroshilov on Spanish conditions and on the behavior of Russians in Spain—arrested.

General Uritzky, of the Moscow War Office, in charge of arms shipments to the Loyalists—arrested.

No outsider knows what happened to most of these men after their imprisonment.

This purge of men to whom republican Spain owes a debt for big services was no more serious and costly, however, than the destruction of other rich Soviet military and civilian talent on a much larger scale. Thousands of fine young Soviet men are now paying for it in the Finnish war. But individuals do not count where only one individual counts.

[*This is the concluding article of Mr. Fischer's series.*]

Is Scandinavia Next?

The Anti-Nordic Germans

BY JOACHIM JOESTEN

Oslo, December 26

A NAUSEATING comedy is ended—not a day too soon. With the publication of the cynical account of "Germany's Relations with the Northern Countries During the Past Twenty Years," released through the D. N. B., the official German news agency, on December 7, Nazi Germany threw off the Nordic mask it had worn far too long. The release was probably the most mendacious, ungrateful, and distorted statement that has yet come out of Dr. Goebbels's propaganda machine.

After the World War, when Germany was down and out, says Goebbels, it "waited in vain for some show of sympathy or effective moral support" from the Northern countries. What of the thousands of *Wienerkinder,* a term comprising both German and Austrian war orphans, who were rescued by generous Scandinavian foster-parents? What of the unending stream of *Liebesgaben* that poured into the Reich from the Northern countries both during and after the war? What of the hundreds of millions of kroner which those countries invested in the renascent economy of post-war Germany? To say nothing of the historical fact that it was thanks to essential supplies—both home products and transit goods—from Scandinavia that the German armies broke down only in 1918, instead of two years earlier; or of the equally historical fact that certain Northern countries, up to the summer of 1935, played an important role in the secret rearmament of the Reich.

Who was the unselfish, untiring *porte-parole* for ostracized Germany at Geneva, long before it was itself readmitted to the concert of civilized nations? Who, if not the Danish Foreign Minister, Dr. Munch, vetoed League sanctions against the Reich after each of Hitler's lawless coups? And did not the Swedish Academy year after year give German scientists much-needed cash and encouragement by granting a larger proportion of Nobel prizes to them than to the scientists of any other country?

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The truth is that the Northern countries, out of a certain feeling of racial affinity and a great admiration for the true spirit of Germany, have stuck to it through thick and thin. None of them has ever been anti-German in any way. But they have, as one man, instinctively and uncompromisingly rejected the Nazi mentality, which is wholly incompatible with their own way of life and thought.

Now at last it has become unmistakably clear—as the best Germans have always known—that the spirit of Hitlerism, with its flaunted inhumanity and barbarism, with its degrading *Kadaver-Gehorsam* and *Führer-Prinzip,* is the exact antithesis of the truly Nordic element in the German national character. It was in keeping that the Nazis should finally turn against the true bearers of the Nordic spirit and tradition. As long as there exists a peaceful, democratic, prosperous Scandinavia, it will be by force of contrast a continual reproach to the Nazis. They may not relish the thought of Soviet air and naval bases dotting the "German lake" and they probably consider the Russian military operations rather bungled, but for all that they must feel a psychological relief at the prospect of the Northern eyesore at last meeting its fate.

The Swedes, except for a tiny minority of Nazi admirers, never dreamed of joining an anti-Soviet crusade, but neither did it ever occur to them that they might one day have the Red Army rolling up against their doorsteps, with Hitler, the Savior, and Göring, that great friend of Sweden, piously washing their hands. I wonder whether one could, the world over, find anyone more discountenanced these days than Sven Hedin, or the brothers General and Admiral de Champs, or Göring's brother-in-law, Count Erik von Rosen, or others of the disillusioned, disgusted advocates of the *Reichsvereinigung Schweden-Deutschland.*

I have read, in the course of years, a good many books and pamphlets by leading Swedish military writers discussing the strategic position of their country from every conceivable angle: in a war between Germany and Russia, between Britain and Russia, between Britain and Germany, between an Anglo-German combination and Russia. These, I repeat, were the "conceivable" cases. None brought the Swedish strategists to despair, for each of them was bound to create a certain balance of power in the Baltic, as far as Sweden was concerned.

And now the inconceivable has happened. With Stalin's troops endeavoring to drive through Finland to Sweden's frontiers, the entire German press trains its big guns on Sweden. There was no mistaking the sense of the Nazi campaign which led to the resignation of Foreign Minister Sandler of Sweden. It closely followed the pattern of the earlier assaults on Benes, Beck, and—by the Soviet press—Cajander. Whether it will abate now that the object of its wrath has disappeared, remains to be seen. But I doubt it. For it was not only Sandler's policy that irked the Nazis; it was Sweden's vigorously maintained neutrality.

Sweden committed the crime of rejecting a proffered commercial agreement with the Nazis that would have meant the discontinuation of all trade with the Allies and might have brought on war with them. It also had the insolence to protest when Nazi mine layers, a few weeks ago, proceeded to mine its territorial waters. It even went so far as to inquire in Berlin why and how long the Germans proposed to detain in their ports some 65,000 tons of Swedish shipping destined to neutral countries. Think of it! *Gott strafe Schweden!*

So Sweden now stands officially branded "unneutral." And with it Norway, which dared to release the City of Flint and carries on a lively trade with Britain. Denmark, thus far, is still in Hitler's good graces, but for how long? It made a hit when, alone of the four Northern countries, it signed last May a non-aggression pact with Germany. Finland's, Sweden's, and Norway's polite refusal to do so is now the Nazis' trump card against them.

No one can say whether the threats and abuse in the Nazi press will be followed by action. Shall we really see Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia jointly make a meal of Scandinavia, the erstwhile "quiet corner" of the world? If so, will Britain and France, will the United States, stand by? These questions, this anxiety, haunt everyone up here. But perhaps I should not voice them, for Scandinavia is neutral.

Sweden Prepares

BY MAURICE FELDMAN

SWEDEN'S foreign policy has always been one of diplomatic impartiality toward Russia and Germany. The whole Northern group of nations—Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden—has been devoted to the principles of the League of Nations. As late as four weeks after the outbreak of the war in Europe a Swedish newspaper close to the government carried an enthusiastic hymn to Geneva. The disappointment over the League's failure was great in the Scandinavian countries, which had honestly and fervently believed in a world-wide union of free peoples. Since the war started, Sweden's foreign policy has been directed to establishing closer contacts with the so-called Oslo states, a group which includes Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The aim of Richard Sandler, until recently Swedish Foreign Minister, was to keep the Northern bloc out of the war under all circumstances and to maintain normal commercial relations with foreign countries. Sweden's exports of pulp, cellulose, iron ore, and machines are of vital importance to the national economy. Among the purchasers of its exports England

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comes first, Germany second, and the United States third. The chief export to the United States is cellulose, to England pulp, and to Germany iron ore. Swedish iron ore, considered the best in the world, is vitally important to Germany, especially in war time. Of the fifteen million tons produced yearly by the Grängesberg works at Kiruna in northern Sweden, not less than eight million tons goes to Germany. On the other hand, Swedish banks and financiers are bound up more closely with England and the United States than with Germany. The richest man in Sweden, Karl Axel Wenner-Gren, for instance, has his largest interests in England and the United States, and the connection of most Swedish banks, particularly of the Enskilda Bank, with the London City is very close. Commercial and financial relations with the Soviet Union are negligible.

The annexation of Finland by Soviet Russia would bring Sweden into the Russian sphere of influence. Simultaneously with the attacks on J. E. Erkko, the former Finnish Foreign Minister, the Russian radio broadcast threats against the Swedes. Russia's Dr. Goebbels, Andrey Zhdanov, said in a radio address on November 12: "Herr Sandler, the lackey of English-French imperialism, is encouraging the use of the so-called neutral states as tools against the interests of the Soviet Union. This social fascist gentleman [Sandler is a Social Democrat and has translated the works of Karl Marx into Swedish] is forcing Russia to go to war. We do not fear him or his bragging Finnish colleagues. They can learn something from Beck and Moscicki." Even more ominous were the negotiations between Molotov and the Swedish minister to Moscow, O. W. Winther, in which Russian threats were clearly implied. Ultimately, Russia will hardly be satisfied with control of Swedish foreign policy. It will demand important strategic territories, particularly the island of Gotland, Sweden's most important air base.

Since Sweden, like Finland, has no intention of meekly submitting to the Russians' demands, preparations for the defense of the country have been accelerated. Complete plans have been drawn up for the evacuation of Stockholm, which has a population of 560,000. Enough foodstuffs, raw materials, and gasoline have been stored to last two years. Sweden's chances of holding out are better than were Poland's or than Finland's seemed to be. I have talked to high Swedish officers and officials, and they are not at all pessimistic about the defense possibilities of their country. The Swedish air force is small; it probably consists of not more than 250 to 300 planes. And there is a scarcity of tanks. But in the Bofors works Sweden has one of the finest and most modern armament plants in the world. This concern, which employs 6,000 workers and is controlled by Wenner-Gren, makes first-class cannon and the famous 40-millimeter anti-aircraft guns, which are not surpassed by the product of any other gun factory in the world.

The Swedish army, when fully mobilized, has at the most 800,000 to 900,000 men, but it is well trained and equipped and would prove no mean foe for an invading army. Moreover, the Swedish defenders would have the advantage of the natural situation of the country. With a population of only 6,500,000, Sweden has almost as large an area as Germany. There are only eleven persons to a square kilometer. The industries are not concentrated in one area but stretch from Kiruna in Lapland, the seat of the iron-ore industry, to the rubber works of Trelleborg, the southernmost city in Sweden. Attacks from the air would have only widely scattered objects to shoot at. Enemy operations in the Baltic Sea would be greatly hampered by mine fields which the Swedes and Finns have laid since the war broke out. On land the great mountains in the north and the immense forests that cover the country would favor the defenders. An invading army would have great difficulty in maintaining its mobility and striking power.

The Swedes are fully aware that they and the other Scandinavian nations are bound up with Finland for better or worse. At a recent mass-meeting in Stockholm one of Sweden's leading military strategists, Lieutenant Colonel Magnus Dryssen, declared that an investigation by the Swedish Royal Defense Commission had shown that if the Finnish army were strengthened, it could block the Russian invasion for months. "Finland's, Sweden's, and Norway's independence," he said, "can only be safeguarded effectively if these three nations unite and defend themselves collectively. If Finland falls, and thereby also the Aaland Islands, the chances of a successful defense of the other Scandinavian countries will not be very great. The geographical situation of Sweden is such that the country cannot withstand a Russia which controls the Baltic, Finland, and the Aaland Islands." One of the leading anti-fascists and left-wing Socialists in Sweden, Dr. Alf Ahlberg, told the same audience that "he who does not fight for Finland has no right to call himself a Swede."

One of the most active workers for Finland is Dr. Georg Branting, the son of Hjalmar Branting, who founded the Swedish Social Democratic Party. Dr. Branting, an "extreme left-wing" Socialist and editor of the periodical *Sovjetnytt* (*Soviet News*), has completely broken with the Communists and is now heading the Swedish-Finnish Aid Committee. (During the Spanish civil war he was chairman of the International Aid Committee for Loyalist Spain.) With the formation of the new Swedish coalition government representing all parties, internal political differences are rapidly disappearing. On all sides there is genuine regret that Per Albin Hansson, the Prime Minister, found it necessary to replace Foreign Minister Sandler, who has always been extremely popular with the Swedish people and whose foreign policy had their full confidence. Sandler's

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successor, Christian de Günther, formerly minister to Norway, is a career diplomat without political affiliations. His appointment was presumably made to appease the Russians and Germans.

The Swedish people and their government know that the fate of their country will be decided in Finland. The recently concluded commercial treaty with England contains a clause which guarantees British help in case Sweden is attacked by Germany, but makes no mention of military assistance in the event of a Russian invasion. It is clear, then, why thousands of Swedish and Norwegian volunteers are flocking to Finland and enrolling in the Finnish army, and why Sweden and Norway are extending liberal help, officially and unofficially, to Finland. A "Nordic Corps" of 10,000 men is already on Finnish soil and a second corps of another 10,000 men is being organized. The new year finds a war at Sweden's door, and the shadow of Moscow falls on the land.

Twilight of the Chain Gang

BY WALTER WILSON

FOR half a century the South's penal system has been considered particularly cruel and degrading. Many writers have exposed the shocking conditions in the prisons and the brutalities of the chain gangs, and painted horrifying pictures of convicts tortured in steel cages, flogged to death, or making desperate efforts to escape, pursued by bloodhounds and men with shotguns. Recently, however, we have been told that extensive reforms have been introduced, and the South has challenged its critics to revise their judgments. The Jacksonville *Times-Union,* for example, not long ago invited "those penmen who have berated this section of the country to ply their trade with equal assiduity in heralding the improvement of conditions in convict camps."

I have myself frequently protested against conditions in Southern prisons, and when I heard it asserted that a major transformation had been effected, I decided to investigate. I went to the chain-gang country, made a personal survey, and discovered that since 1933, and chiefly since 1936, the South has made definite progress toward a more humane and intelligent penal system. To appreciate the reforms accomplished, one must recall the conditions that had persisted almost without change since the close of the Civil War. The men who at that time established the penal system for the Southern states were less interested in setting up machinery for the administration of justice and the protection of society from crime than in obtaining a reservoir of quasi-slaves and a weapon for terrorizing freedmen and poor whites. Under the system they devised the services of convicts were leased to private employers. Planters and business men went to the prisons and after signing a so-called contract drove the convicts away in chains as if they were work animals. They then worked them, starved them, flogged them, or even killed them as they saw fit. This lease system was not finally eradicated from its last stronghold in the mines of Alabama until 1927.

After abolition of the private lease the local governments took over the machinery of justice, but proved only slightly more humane. The sufferings endured by prisoners under county authorities were strikingly exposed a few years ago by the book and the movie "I Am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang."

More recently Southern prison officials have been proving receptive to the modern idea that terror neither deters men from crime nor maintains prison discipline. The degrading punishments of the road gang are on their way out. Chains and shackles are being eliminated. In North Carolina, for example, only 2 per cent of the prisoners wear shackles. Georgia has announced that all "maximum-security" men will be kept inside the walls of the new central penitentiary at Reidsville, and that men in the camps outside will not be required to wear stripes, chains, or shackles. Tennessee and Kentucky have recently joined the states which have made flogging illegal. A few other states, while retaining statutes legalizing the lash, have taken practical steps to end its use. The present penal administration in Alabama has announced that under no circumstances will wardens be allowed to whip prisoners. The new head of the Texas Prison Board, Dr. Sidney M. Lister, has suspended the "bat" (lash) in his state for two years. Dr. Lister says he is confident that he can demonstrate by the improved morale of the prisoners that corporal punishment is unnecessary.

In accordance with the practice in progressive prisons elsewhere, the South is adopting solitary confinement on restricted diet as the chief means of maintaining discipline. Tennessee and North Carolina rely almost entirely on this method. Georgia adopted it in March, 1937, and at the same time abolished the stocks. Among the noticeable effects of the change are improved discipline and fewer attempted escapes.

Today in many Southern prisons a majority of the inmates are better housed, fed, and hospitalized than they were in their poverty-stricken homes. By the end of

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this year North Carolina, with the aid of federal funds, will have completed its task of putting all its prisoners in modern camps. Alabama, except in a half-dozen camps, has an excellent system of prison housing. Georgia has some modern camps, and this classic chain-gang state has completed the most important single housing development in the whole section in its new $2,000,000 prison plant at Reidsville. Most of the camps are permanent, fire-proof structures designed to accommodate from 75 to 100 prisoners. They are usually surrounded by a high wire fence inclosing generous outdoor space. In the corner of the yard is a small hospital unit equipped with first-aid and other medical supplies. All camps have hot and cold water, and most of them modern plumbing. Several that I visited last summer even had air-conditioned dining-rooms.

Up to a few years ago such factors as the prisoner's age, previous record, home environment, employment experience, education, type of crime for which he was convicted, and prospects of rehabilitation were not considered important. Today in several Southern states the prison authorities are trying to build up files of information about each prisoner, to provide suitable employment for him, and to establish separate camps for the various classes—misdemeanants, felons, first offenders, recidivists, young offenders, women. Classification work has been going on in North Carolina, the first state to undertake it, since 1935. The Work Projects Administration has been cooperating with the state of Georgia in setting up a model classification department in the new Reidsville Prison, which is to be the receiving prison for the whole state. Alabama has just added two new wings to Kilby Prison to house the classification department. This state has already established a camp for misdemeanants near Montgomery, and the new Draper Prison at Speigner is exclusively for young men and first offenders.

Another feature of the new prison technique is the emphasis upon education, recreation, and vocational training for convicts. Most of the central prisons and practically all of the camps built within the past six years have rest rooms and recreation yards, and many provide competitive sports. Last summer I witnessed a rousing good baseball game between the central prison and the camp for young offenders, under twenty-one, outside Raleigh, North Carolina. Baseball teams, bands, and show troupes from Texas prisons hold a jamboree and rodeo at Huntsville each fall. This affair is open to visitors, and the considerable gate receipts are a major source of income for the general recreation fund.

If complaints against the old whipping bosses are no longer heard, wardens are occasionally accused of "coddling convicts" by providing not only exercise and recreation but schooling. In several states illiterate prisoners are required to attend classes—hardly a fourth of Southern convicts can read even road signs, and very few have reached the sixth grade. Two or three states have gone farther. Texas, for instance, while making classes compulsory for illiterates only, offers inducement to others by giving them five "good-time" days a month for attending. A class in shop mechanics is open to Texas prisoners, and a course in English has been established for those who wish to learn the printing trade.

In the South, as in other parts of the country, a good start has been made toward abolishing the few old industries chosen for their profit and toward installing a variety of new ones which fit a man to earn a living. Among these industries are cotton-textile manufacturing, cotton-seed-oil extracting, printing, automobile-plate manufacturing, machine shops, electrical work, tanneries, tailoring, and shoe-repairing. They employ prisoners who work inside from choice or experience or because they require maximum-security confinement. Road work and agriculture are the chief occupations outside the prison walls. Some attention is being given to teaching modern methods of farming. Many prisoners, in consequence, will come out better equipped to wrest a livelihood from the soil than most of their neighbors. In Alabama the farming program is being planned, says Bruce Airey of the State Classification Division, "with the idea of giving much of the scientific agricultural training provided in the state agricultural schools." In one Alabama prison the inmates are experimenting with silk-worm culture.

Another new development in the South is the effort being made to rehabilitate criminals through probation and parole. Francis Hiller, field secretary of the National Probation Association, told me that public interest in the improvement of probation and parole during the past three or four years has been more marked in the South than in any other part of the country. North Carolina's parole system is listed among the nation's ten best by the United States Attorney's office. Amendments to Alabama's constitution overwhelmingly voted last July permit the establishment of a parole and probation set-up which can be entirely divorced from politics.

Without a trained, well-paid personnel attempts at prison reform must fail in the long run. Despite many difficulties, not the least of which is the poverty of the South, progress is being made in this respect. Governor Rivers of Georgia proposes to establish six weeks' training courses for the present wardens and guards along the lines of the New York program, and experts have already been obtained from the federal penitentiary in Atlanta to train the personnel at the big Reidsville Prison. For all future appointments the Governor recommends the merit system.

For the first time since the Civil War Southern prison officials are visiting and studying prisons in other parts of the country. Also for the first time since the Civil War "outsiders" are being sought as allies. The United

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States Prison Industries Reorganization Administration (P. I. R. A.) was asked by nine Southern governors to send experts to survey conditions in their prisons and to offer recommendations for improving them. The invitations were accepted, and the P. I. R. A. has received credit for many of the subsequent reforms.

Much more, of course, will have to be done before Southern prisons measure up to the best penal institutions in such states as Wisconsin, New York, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. Flogging, while resorted to infrequently, is still legal in a few states. Often the prisoner is released after serving his time as hopeless as Jean Valjean, with barely enough clothing to cover his nakedness and with no prospects of employment. The "county-rights" political system prevents uniform standards in penal methods. (Both North Carolina and Alabama have recently placed all convicts under centralized control, and a few Georgia counties have relinquished their prisoners to the state.) Too few educational opportunities are offered; prisoners are worked too hard and much too long; and in certain prisons the personnel is still made up of brutal, ignorant bullies. Probation and parole work needs expansion; classification work should be extended.

Enlightened Southerners do not attempt to hide these conditions. Rather they are showing a willingness to probe deeply into the social and economic injustices which underly the prison problem. They recognize the connection between the poverty of the South and the fact that its prison population is from five to eight times greater in proportion to the general population than is the case in other sections of the country.Southern groups have published the fact that Alabama in 1937 had 201 prison commitments per 100,000 as against New York's 24. Progressive thinkers are insisting that the question of prison reform cannot be isolated. Tarleton Collier, Atlanta newspaper columnist and expert on Georgia prisons, said recently, "We may remake Georgia by remaking our penal system." Connected with it, he declared, are "youth problems, political problems, problems of court procedure, of equal opportunities and equal justice."

In the Wind

FOR A GOOD many months American radio networks have been trying to arrange regular broadcasts from Moscow comparable to those now heard from Paris, London, and Berlin. After long and futile effort one of the major networks recently telephoned Ambassador Oumansky for help. "Officially," retorted Oumansky, "write me a letter. Confidentially, it won't do any good."

LIFE RECENTLY devoted a three-page spread to Florence Linden, who has been lecturing for several years on the etiquette of cigarette smoking under the auspices of the Philip Morris Company. The *Life* spread, which should have been a Philip Morris publicity man's dream, showed Miss Linden carefully opening a package of Lucky Strikes.

LEADING AMERICAN newspapers—among others the New York *Times* and *Herald Tribune,* the Philadelphia *Inquirer,* and the *Washington Post*—have been carrying large unsigned ads extolling French gloves, French champagne, French fashions—and "France, Land of Liberty." None of the ads give any hint of their sponsorship. It has been learned that they originated in Paris, in the offices of the Havas Agency, official French news and advertising agency, and were placed in this country through Joshua B. Powers and Company, Paris space representatives of the *Times.* The outlay was $30,000.

THE BROOKLYN Church and Mission Federation recently adopted a stinging resolution denouncing the Christian Front. The resolution was posted in church lobbies throughout the city. A few Sundays ago, while church services were in progress, the resolutions were quietly removed from all the bulletin boards, neatly folded, and placed on a table in the lobby.

DIPLOMATIC NOTE: Commenting on rumors of a possible Nazi invasion of Holland or Belgium, Major General Oba, military expert for the Japanese *Mainichi,* wrote cryptically: "In view of Adolf Hitler's assurances that the neutrality of Belgium and Holland will be respected, it is premature to judge at this moment whether or not Germany really means to advance her troops to those two countries near the English Channel."

THE REPORT of the American Civil Liberties Union on the Dies committee has been held up and the first draft is being overhauled because some of the Union's executive-board members think it's too gentle. . . . A group of professors at the Catholic University Law School in Washington is preparing a "brief" charging Father Coughlin with violations of canon law. . . . John Brophy, C. I. O. leader most often accused of Stalinist leanings, has become bitterly anti-Communist since the signing of the Moscow-Berlin pact.

A JAPANESE DIPLOMAT was asked recently whether he thought his nation would ultimately enter the war on Germany's side. "I doubt it," he replied slowly, "the custom of hara-kiri seems to be definitely dying out in my country."

A QUIET BOOST for French Communists appears in "Facts in Review," a Nazi propaganda leaflet periodically issued by the Germany Library of Information. The item runs: "*Humanité,* leading Communist newspaper in France, has been suppressed but it manages to appear, nevertheless, in mimeographed editions. When a Communist textile syndicate in Lyons was dissolved, *Humanité* was not published because police confiscated its mimeograph. The next day, however, the paper appeared again with the heading: '*Humanité* Officially Confiscated.' "

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind —either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of $5 will be awarded each month for the best item.*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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Issues and Men

BY OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD

AGAIN the President has demanded of Congress increased appropriations for army and navy. He asks $271,999,523 more in this fiscal year "for the proper observance, safeguarding, and enforcing of the neutrality of the United States and the strengthening of national defense." The total for the two defense services in the budget for 1940-41 is the enormous sum of $1,800,000,000. I presume that we may take the Kansas City *Star's* comment, that "the national-defense statement was reasonable," as representing the average opinion of it. Yet it was not reasonable, for all army and navy appropriations are unreasonable as long as they are not based upon a thorough study of the problems of national defense and a clear understanding of the possible enemies of the United States by whom it could conceivably be attacked. I know that there is less need of great defense expenditures today than there has been for many years. It is gratifying to note the number of Congressmen who are demanding an accounting of these items.

I have not just come from the belligerent European nations without knowing that they are far less able to attack the United States today than they were when war came in September, and that the last thing they are thinking about is attempting it. Even if Hitler should win this war, Europe would be prostrate for years, and a victorious Hitler would be surrounded by enemies who would welcome his getting embroiled in a war with the United States. I asked a British major general in London just before I left whether he had ever heard of a European military or naval officer who thought that an attack upon the United States in any form was feasible. "Preposterous," he said, "absolutely preposterous and impossible. No one dreams of such a thing." This officer has been stationed in the United States and knows our military conditions and our chief military leaders.

Since I have been for years demanding that calm logic and not hysteria should control our military policy, I was delighted lately to receive additional support for the proposal I advanced in my little book "Our Military Chaos" that there should be an immediate inquiry by an unbiased group, preferably civilian and non-Congressional, into just what dangers, if any, confront us. Thus, General Hugh Johnson, while saying that he cannot support many of my conclusions, strongly urges my principal recommendation, "which is that we need an impartial, non-partisan, extra-governmental commission to look into this question." He cites General Marshall, Chief of Staff, as having just said that in spite of the billions we have lavished on the War Department our defense is not 25 per cent effective. General Marshall charges this to the historians of the United States, who, he says, have always represented us as being victorious in our wars and have failed to record our defeats. But General Johnson points out that there are other culprits. He says: "I would shudder to see a careful compilation of comparative unit costs—per soldier or per ton of shipping—as between our own and the armies and navies of all other nations. It would shock the country." He concludes: "A commission of inquiry is imperative. If it finds that this column and Mr. Villard's book are wrong, it will be a splendid vindication which I, for one, would welcome. If it finds that we are only partly right, the country ought to know it."

Writing in the New York *Herald Tribune,* Major George Fielding Eliot, who approaches the problem from a different point of view than mine, said on January 4: "It is plain that we cannot continue as in the past making plans for defense without some definite idea of what we are going to defend; the army and navy cannot decide what they need until they know what they are going to have to do with it. The point is well taken that the major decision of this sort which now confronts us is whether we are going to prepare for the defense of the Western Hemisphere, or whether we are going to plan for military adventures overseas." But Major Eliot desires a permanent Committee of National Defense with Congressional representation to study particular problems, to straighten out our "tangled defense scheme," and to command "a greater degree of public confidence when heavy expenditures are called for." I still feel that the first inquiry should come from an absolutely independent commission without Congressional or military or naval members, since these are bound to be biased if only by reason of their training.

It is quite characteristic of President Roosevelt that his new budget shows an increase only for national defense. He does not succeed in justifying it; he could not if he would justify the increases in the army and navy and coast guard which he ordered at the outbreak of the war, an action which struck foreign observers—I was in England at the time—as absurd and inexplicable. He cannot justify the 300-mile safety zone around the Americas, which is utterly impracticable and ridiculous. Does he expect British and German warships which may begin an action 302 miles from us to stop fighting when they cross the 300-mile line?

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BOOKS and the ARTS

The Icon and the Portrait

THE LAST FLOWER. By James Thurber. Harper and Brothers. $2.

ABOUT PEOPLE. By William Steig. Random House. $2.50.

THERE has always been a competition in the visual arts between iconography and portraiture, the symbolic and the unique, the God and the mortal. In the great periods of Italian and German art, that is, up to the middle of the sixteenth century, these two elements coexisted in a fruitful tension and equilibrium. Not only was it possible, for instance, to use realistic portraits of models for icons in religious pictures, but also the relation of man to the rest of nature, of the spiritual to the temporal was never in doubt; witness the elaborate and significant, almost surrealist landscapes in such painting.

For a whole complex of reasons, psychological, political, and economic, this equilibrium was destroyed. The main current of painting confined itself more and more to portraiture, whether of people or still life, and iconography was relegated to the cartoon, which, the genius of Goya and Daumier notwithstanding, wore a slightly disreputable air, as if it had to apologize for not being noble or serious.

In recent years, however, iconography has begun to recover its prestige; the interest in child art, Negro sculpture, and doodling, the popularity of Disney and Thurber are evidences of this. Yet a synthesis of icon and portrait is still far off. The former remains non-representational, the latter accidental. It would be as impertinent as it is unnecessary for me to praise Mr. Thurber's work; everyone knows and loves it. All I can do is to point out what I believe to be certain deficiencies common both to him as an artist and to us all as people.

The spiritual father of the tradition to which both Mr. Thurber and Mr. Steig belong is Edward Lear, that remarkable artist who supplemented what he thought of as his serious work, his realistic pre-Raphaelite landscapes, with scribbled diagrams of his inner life. To Lear as to Thurber after him, the icon is the average non-political man of an industrialized society—who is surprisingly the same in Park Avenue and the Bowery—the person who in large enough numbers makes up what the damned refer to as the Masses. The popularity of their work with all classes indicates that such an icon is a valid one for our present stage of culture.

Is it not, then, a little disconcerting to find how little of life has today any iconographic significance, that is, seems both universal and capable of inspiring reverence and love? Not only landscape but the human figure itself has to be reduced to the barest outline—even sexual differences almost disappear. All detail, all portraiture belong to the world of the enemy, those unpleasant and powerful forces which Lear called "They" and Thurber calls the Liberators, the world whose art is the realistic bosh of society portraits and statues representing the workers of tomorrow. The realm of modern freedom is indeed limited.

"The Last Flower" is a parable about social life. Their amenities destroyed by war, deserted even by their dogs, down to their last flower, a young man and woman rediscover sex; society is rebuilt; back come the dogs and the politicians and war; and the cycle begins all over again. This is at once both too pessimistic and not pessimistic enough. It suggests (1) that all politicians are equally evil, and (2) that all lovers are without error. But the public and the private life are not so distinct. If all politicians do evil, yet no lover is innocent, and there are better and worse politicians just as there are better and worse lovers. Mr. Thurber's heresy is particularly dangerous because it flatters our conceit; every reader will call the lovers Me and My Girl, while he will equally naturally call the Liberators Mr. R or Mr. H.

This is where Mr. Steig comes in. When Mr. Thurber has debunked the Liberators, Mr. Steig carries on by debunking the lovers. If "About People" makes others as uncomfortable as it makes me, I'm afraid Mr. Steig will not become widely popular; for he is unequivocally pessimistic: the only virtue he grants the human species is a capacity to perceive and laugh at its folly. Though this is, I believe, too negative to be an adequate response to life—a sense of humor is rarely without an element of fear—it is an indispensable preliminary. We shall never earn the right to lift our heads till we have learned to hang them.

Nor is it, I hope, merely fanciful, to connect this politico-ethical problem of our thinking and conduct with the artistic problem of how to combine the icon and the portrait. Just as we have still to discover the proper relations of the private and public life, so the inward-looking artist has to unlearn his puritanical distrust of matter, and the outward-looking his crude faith in the kingdoms of this world. Logos and Eros have yet to be reconciled in a new Agape.

W. H. AUDEN

Army Without Banners

NO ARMS, NO ARMOUR. By Robert Henriques. Farrar and Rinehart. $2.50.

THE British army in peace time, without benefit of Fuzzy-wuzzy charges or even Boches dumping grenades into trenches—that is the unusual background for the All-Nations Prize Novel Competition winner, written by a thirty-four-year-old major of artillery. Instead of exploiting the easy glamour of martial pageantry, Major Henriques studies his army, particularly the under-officer class—lieutenants to majors—merely as a human organization which, through its detachment from ordinary human relationships, accentuates the strength or weakness of each of its members: which either strips them of all individuality, stamping them in the sub-human mold of Soldier, or forces them to grow a philosophical shell of skepticism or blind faith or cheerio-carry-on flippancy. Anything to integrate the relentless mechanism of army life with a thinking man's sense of personal existence; anything to forge an armor against life. There is Sammy, the

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major, who fortifies himself with a glowing faith in human potentialities that endears him to his subordinates but effectively bars him from further advancement; he is killed in a brief skirmish in Africa—the only fighting that occurs in the book. There is "Daddy" Watson, an embittered cynic with a penchant for proselyting and whiskey, whose armor is his conviction that nothing good is to be expected. But chiefly there is Tubby Windrush, a polo-playing young lieutenant with money and a good family name, public school and all that, a typical Richard Aldington hero at his first appearance but redeemed by a mind that soon begins stirring and groping after some sort of truth. Under the tutelage of Sammy and Daddy, under the stress of physical pain after a steeplechase smash-up, and finally under the supreme test of solitude, he forges his own spiritual armor.

Major Henriques is not an especially polished writer, and some of his asides could well be dispensed with, but he has unquestionably lived his material, and his people have a three-dimensional solidity which thoroughly vitalizes the story. There is philosophizing, it is true, but there are also quarrels, loves, courts martial, automobile accidents, and treks through the desert. And strangely enough, even an army, as an army, has a certain personality, which perhaps expresses itself more in peace time than in war. I should like to see someone equally well qualified make a similar novel out of the American military.

LOUIS B. SALOMON

Two Crises in One

THE CATHOLIC CRISIS. By George Seldes. Julian Messner. $3.

WHICH WAY, DEMOCRACY? By Wilfred Parsons, S. J. The Macmillan Company. $2.

GEORGE SELDES would have been at home with S. S. McClure or the elder Pulitzer. He is handicapped in a period when the popular magazines are slick, the newspapers leashed and house-broken. "The Catholic Crisis," like most of Seldes's books, is a one-man journalistic campaign which has had to be conducted in the uncongenial sedateness of book covers. He could hardly have picked a more explosive subject. Cardinal Manning once said that the future of the church lies in America, but more and more people are beginning to doubt that the future of America lies in the church. Hilaire Belloc predicted "the necessary conflict between the civil state and the Catholic church" in this country, and Seldes reviews the factors that are laying the basis for a conflict, though it is still far from inescapable. The attempt to muzzle the press in favor of Franco during the Spanish civil war, the part played by the hierarchy in the fight against the Child-Labor Amendment, the increasing power over the movies wielded by aesthetically illiterate and politically reactionary Catholics, the strong support given by Catholics to Hague as "an American Duplessis," and the poison broadcast by Coughlin are bringing an American anti-clericalism into being. True, one will find little if any reference to these matters in a cowed press, but recent elections have shown that the newspapers are not necessarily an index of what people are thinking.

Seldes is not a Catholic-baiter. He has written no one-sided attack. He is generous in his presentation of what Catholics, cleric and lay, are doing on the left as well as the right. His earlier "The Vatican—Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" showed that he could handle a Catholic subject temperately and fairly; it became a Catholic Book-of-the-Month selection. This one deserves to be, if only to give progressive Catholics a picture of what liberals of their faith are doing. It was a Catholic, John Longo, who went to jail in the fight against Hague. It was a Jesuit priest, Father Charles of the Jesuit faculty of theology at Louvain, who traced the notorious Protocols back to their illegitimate origin. The Gallup poll showed that despite the heat turned on by church propagandists, one-third of American Catholics were for neither side in the Spanish struggle, and that of the remainder actually 42 per cent were for the Loyalists.

If "The Catholic Crisis" leaves one puzzled and dismayed, the fault is not the author's. Under the broad roof of an institution based on dogma infallibly expounded there seem to exist the most bewildering inconsistency and diversity of opinion. In Rome, where the shadow of the fasces falls on the cross, the Pope attacks racism. But in America the chief disseminator of anti-Semitism is a Catholic priest. The late Pius XI regarded events in the Reich *"mit brennender Sorge,"* but the Bund cheers and the *Völkischer Beobachter* applauds the Nazi apologetics of Coughlin. Like most large organizations the church seems better at hindsight than foresight. Father Parsons in "Which Way, Democracy?" can see clearly now that "in France the Royalist politicians kept Catholics for two generations from the *ralliement* to the republic to which Leo XIII had called them, on the ground that the republic was a persecuting state." He declines to see that the separation of church and state decreed by the French republic differed little from that attempted by the Spanish, or that Franco and his foreign allies used the church in Spain as the Royalists did in France. He can write, "In Spain the alliance of the clergy with the landowning nobles and the conservative politicians was largely the cause of the growth of a large church-hating proletariat." Yet he still sees the Franco revolt as "a struggle of liberation in Spain from a red tyranny" and the non-intervention committee as "a delightful piece of double-dealing."

"Which Way, Democracy?" is the best answer to critics of "The Catholic Crisis." The former editor-in-chief of the weekly *America* is an outstanding Jesuit publicist. He writes with distinction. He is not a Catholic Liberty Leaguer. He quotes with approval the late Cardinal Mundelein's condemnation of employers who use the cry of communism as a cloak for social injustice. He has the same innate fondness for communism that the late Billy Sunday had for his old sparring partner, the devil. "It has," he says, "everything the true religion has, except God." He puts an arm around the freethinker Jefferson and claims a Jesuit origin for the ideas in the Declaration of Independence. But no Catholic can read "Which Way, Democracy?" without feeling that democracy's probable course is to perdition, that this country was never intended to be democratic, that racial inequality is not incompatible with democracy, that fascism has many virtues, that the best form of government is probably the corporate state, and that this exists in its most ideal form in Portugal—"such a state can preserve liberty in all its essentials as well as a democracy of the old model. In fact, in the presence of an

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enlightened public opinion, it might preserve it much better." If democracy really originated with Jesuit thinkers, it seems odd that Father Parsons, himself of the society, is so ready to abandon it.

Characteristically equivocal is his attitude toward the Jews; he is against racism, but hints darkly of horrible things in the Talmud. The Catholic attitude, he feels, is to treat the Jew justly but deprive him "of power to harm." Revealing is his discovery that "it is significant that it was not until Christendom had broken up and seemed to be on the verge of dissolution about the time of the French Revolution that the Jews achieved final emancipation in Europe." Herr Rosenberg says the same thing, though not in gentle innuendo. Father Parsons, like so many Catholic thinkers, agrees with the fascists in a hatred for 1789. But can one be against 1789 and for 1776?

I. F. STONE

Norris of Nebraska

DEMOCRACY'S NORRIS. By Alfred Lief. Stackpole Sons. $3.50.

SENATOR NORRIS of Nebraska recently made some caustic remarks about the peculiar financing of an electric company, a subsidiary of the Commonwealth and Southern Corporation, the sprawling holding company over which Wendell Willkie so wordily presides. Instantly there was a great to-do. Arthur Krock in his Washington column in the New York *Times* muttered ominously of a "conspiracy." The New York *Herald Tribune* cried aloud. "Old Iron Pants" Hugh Johnson moved into action by suggesting at a New York dinner of bond peddlers that Wendell Willkie might be a good man for the Republican nomination for the Presidency, a suggestion, by the way, to which Mr. Krock refers wistfully every now and then. Mr. Willkie upon being interviewed allowed Wendell was willin'.

All of which must have caused the senior Senator from Nebraska to chuckle dryly. On July 11 next George William Norris will be seventy-eight years old. In 1913 he spoke in the Senate, to which he had been elected for the first time, in favor of a bill authorizing San Francisco to build a reservoir in the Hetch-Hetchy Valley from which water and power might be taken for the use of the people. The discovery that Norris is a conspirator is thus a bit belated. All through his Senatorial career he has indulged in an Open Conspiracy, to use a Wellsian term. It is the conspiracy of the people of the United States to get back their government and natural resources. Norris was tackling the light and power nabobs when Sam Insull was a petty clerk and Merlin Aylesworth was taking his first lessons in the magic art of making the public pay.

Not until he is well into the seventh chapter, in which he describes Norris's pioneer grapplings with the power gang, does the author of this 548-page biography of Norris really begin to march. Up to the time that Norris enters the Senate, Mr. Lief's is a slow-paced journey filled with the rustling of yellowed newspaper clips. The evidences of the author's laborious researches into the rise of Norris are weighted down with a lifeless style. Indeed, he makes young Norris something of a self-centered careerist and thus fails to prepare us for that display of stiff-necked independence which Norris was to put on in his leadership of the House insurgents against the tyranny of Speaker Cannon. This is too bad because the insurgent movement was no sudden flare-up over committee appointments and House rules. It was the articulation of the hatred of an indigenously radical West for the raw tactics of the finance capitalists back of Cannon. The fight can be and should have been traced back to the grass roots of Populism, the agrarian revolt, and the rise of the Socialists. Ironically enough, Norris's first major victory was over Ashton C. Shallenberger, who had been sent to Congress by left-wing Democrats, Populists, and Silver Republicans. When Norris took Shallenberger's place in 1902, he was forty-one years old, a judge known for the severity of his sentences, who had been a successful lawyer for the Burlington and Missouri Railroad and was then an active member of Beaver City Lodge, F. A. and A. M., Miriam Chapter of the Royal Arch Masons, Commander of the Knights Templar and of the Scottish Rite and Seostris Temple. An unlikely leader indeed for the embattled farmers, small shopkeepers, and industrial workers in their fight against Wall Street's political brokers.

Forces which Mr. Lief somehow ignores put George Norris into the struggle on the people's side, and the lack of an adequate description of those forces leaves a great gap in this biography. Instead of devoting pages to details of Norris's early Congressional campaigns, the author might have given us at least a hint as to the passions that stirred the men of the prairies in the first decade of this century.

No lack of background material or faults of style, however, can detract from the story of Norris's struggle against the power trust. It is by all odds the most exciting saga of the under-dog that our generation knows. It is all there in Mr. Lief's book for those who are today wavering in their faith in the democratic processes to ponder well. You come away from this book with a renewed respect for the sheer persistence of the stocky man from the sticks, standing up in an almost empty Senate chamber year after year doing battle with the united front of greed, hypocrisy, and double-dealing; and at the end winning the glorious victory that is symbolized by the concrete dams and falling waters in the Tennessee Valley. During the black days preceding our entrance into the war, which he so gallantly opposed, Norris remarked, "The people of the United States are not thinking about water power now. We are thinking about militarism." And Mr. Lief adds that the people "could be robbed of their rights without knowing it for a long, long time."

Today with the hoarse shouting of the strategists of World War II ringing in our collective ears, we are lucky to have George Norris around to remind us that the robbers of our rights—civil, economic, and political—are fixing for another killing right here at home, while we are worrying about Bessarabia, Iran, and points east.

MC ALISTER COLEMAN

Coming soon in *The Nation*

What Next on the Left?

Two articles reexamining Marxism and pointing the way to a democratic collectivism

BY LEWIS COREY

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Men of the Confederacy

STATESMEN OF THE LOST CAUSE: JEFFERSON DAVIS AND HIS CABINET. By Burton J. Hendrick. Little, Brown and Company. $3.75.

IN THIS clear and conscientious re-creation of the leading political figures of the Confederacy Mr. Hendrick, author of "The Lees of Virginia" and other works, subjects the legend of the gallant fight against overwhelming odds to a calm, if not strictly impartial, analysis. In admiration of the valor and military genius of the leaders in the field, as in obeisance before the Tidewater aristocracy, this Connecticut Yankee yields to no Southerner. But where other historians have sought the explanation of defeat in economic causes, Mr. Hendrick finds it in the political.

> Had the Confederacy, at the beginning, husbanded its great material asset—cotton—and thus built a solid financial and economic structure; had it rigidly enforced conscription, overridden opposition by suspending habeas corpus and martial law in such places as the circumstances made necessary; had it regulated its abundant food supplies and intelligently applied them to the support of the army and the civilian population, the war might have reached a different end. It did all these things deprecatingly and piecemeal. The enemy that faced it on every front was more than the armed forces of the Federal Union; it was that doctrine of state rights that led to secession and then, when adapted to the Confederacy itself, destroyed its vitality and made useless the splendid exertions of its ably led military forces.

The burning of Atlanta, for example, he shows to have been largely due to the defiance of the Confederate government by the governor of Georgia, who first enrolled every possible able-bodied man in the militia and then refused to place it at the disposal of the Secretary of War, to whom he dispatched, while Sherman was ravaging his state, long constitutional arguments probably composed for him by the Vice-President of the Confederacy himself.

Mr. Hendrick's thesis is important and clarifying, and his presentation of it enlighteningly concrete. The facts which he fuses into one coherent historical narrative are not new to Southerners, though it may take a Northern historian to present them in their full significance. Anyone with a Confederate upbringing can tell Mr. Hendrick that any sympathy felt for Jefferson Davis on the part of Southerners of the old school was due to his treatment at the hands of the North after the war and not to approval of the conduct of the Confederate government. Mr. Hendrick's facts are not new; neither are they the whole story. He greatly underestimates the seriousness of the South's inferiority in industrial development in the first really "totalitarian" war to take place under modern conditions. He does not touch upon the inefficiency of slave labor in times of dislocation of normal routine. And then there are what we should now call the "imponderables." His explanation of the comparative ineptitude of the political leaders by the fact that "the new-rich Southwest contributed the political leaders, the old traditional South the military captains" is too simple. As Mr. Hendrick himself brings out, several of the former were very able men and not of Southern origin at all. (When he remarks that four of the five Confederate generals who won world fame were Virginians, it is tempting to point out that the fifth he mentions, Longstreet, is generally credited in the South with losing the Battle of Gettysburg.)

This is both a fascinating and a needed book; its author shows himself a more than able historian and biographer. Had he not three times won a Pulitzer Prize, it would not be necessary to call attention to defects of style and even of grammar: "President Buchanan sufficiently regarded his diplomatic talents as to offer him the Ministership to Spain"; "His successor, Robert M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, brought to the office a man who had served alongside Davis in the United States Senate." These are fairly typical instances. "A veracious [for "veritable"] 'cavalier'" is an unusually bad slip.

JAMES ORRICK

The Viscera of the Power Process

SWORDS AND SYMBOLS: THE TECHNIQUE OF SOVEREIGNTY. By James Marshall. Oxford University Press. $2.

IN THE field of legal and political science also, in recent years, the shift from the institutional to the functional and psychological approach has become so much a fashion that one begins to wonder why former periods have been so blind as not to see the awful truth revealed to us by modern social psychologists. A Freudian hue affects methods and material. This school no longer takes anything for granted, even at the risk of becoming at times trivial and crashing lustily into wide-open doors. Mr. Marshall's interesting treatise, stemming to all appearances from the intellectual climate of Thurman Arnold's brilliant efforts to lay bare the subconscious of our political and social existence, tries to dismantle sovereignty, the colossus with the feet of clay as he and others seem to believe.

It is another of the endless variations on an old theme. What is political power; how is it operated; what is the power process? But this last attack on sovereignty fails to get closer to the core of the matter than its predecessors because the author, an accomplished lawyer, fails to distinguish between sovereignty as a legal and as a politico-social concept.

The main theme is that sovereignty, "the aggregate of powers possessed by the rulers of a society," is not absolute as the lawyers contend, but limited at least by latent custom and passive resistance emanating from the habits of the people, which prove to be unsurmountable obstacles to arbitrariness in absolute power. There is nothing new in this statement, well taken care of already by Aristotle, Hobbes, and Austin, although the great absolutists or monists of political power could not foresee the new power techniques of compulsory acquiescence through propaganda and coercion in modern totalitarian states. But the lawyer looks at sovereignty from a different angle. In every well-ordered community which deserves the name of a state there must be an ultimate power of decision if anarchy is to be avoided. The author, startled as many before him by this inherent contradiction in concept and practice of sovereignty, identifies sovereignty as an abstract norm of jurisdiction and as the power situation or power relationship. Had he taken sovereignty as

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a condensed formula, or as a symbol familiar both to lawyers and mathematicians, he would have been led to the conclusion that it is merely a working hypothesis for centering the ultimate power of decision in a definite person, organ, group, or class. Some of the best minds of the last generation have tried in vain to dethrone sovereignty. No one has succeeded in refuting Austin, who by depersonalizing sovereignty established it permanently. Society is not the objective for the sovereign power, but the latter is the inescapable result of organized society.

With these reservations the book, replete with erudite quotations and beautifully written, provides a remarkably clear and penetrating inventory of the forces determining political action and a keen analysis of the viscera of the power-generating process. Political power has four weapons—the "sword" or physical force; "gold and bread," or economic pressure; "symbols and words"; and finally education. Law seems to be, for the author, merely a sort of camouflaged violence or violence in abeyance, though it is now generally admitted in legal philosophy that voluntary submission to the established rules of the community is as potent a factor in maintaining social order as the potential threat of sanctions. Among the symbols of political power, controlled by the powers that be or seized by the opposition in quest of political power, are liberty, popular sovereignty, the social compact—incidentally another concept whose revival may be duly expected if and when dictatorships fall—and the "ideal of unity," which is as much an aim as a tool of the "sovereign." A good deal of "debunking" goes on in these chapters analyzing the "symbols," though without the spark of the Arnoldian wit.

The final chapters, on Ethics and Ideals and on Democracy and Equality versus Bureaucracy and War, are decidedly very much thinner and less well substantiated. When the author sums up that "limitation of power is only achieved through a diffusion of physical force and economic power," one fails to see how the first of these premises can be attained without destroying, with political power, the state itself. The state, or to be more precise, the government, must have the undisputed monopoly of physical coercion. The dangers of absolute power, which the author justly considers an evil in itself, are to be countered by the familiar democratic processes of continuous control. It is at this juncture that many of the "exploded myths," such as liberty, social compact, popular sovereignty, *et alia,* come into the picture again. They are not institutionalized slogans but reflections of absolute values which are the sole effective limitations of absolute power.

This leads to a crucial point of disagreement with the book. Its ice-cold analysis of our social existence has the same effect as a theatrical performance seen from behind the stage. The visitor is more conscious of the shabbiness of the decorations and the grease on the face of the actors than of the words spoken and the plot acted. This clever book exudes disillusionment. Here is no belief in a system of absolute and intangible values; the ethical components of our intellectual existence, for which, after all, social institutions should serve, appear merely as abused instruments of the soulless mechanism of political strife. Liberty, if we follow the author, is at best a utilitarian concept, and moral certainties are only parts of the "dominant" ideology or of that of the opposition. Introspection in the social sciences begins to reach the stage of outright agnosticism. One should be aware that a philosophy of the state is above all a philosophy of values discovered by and applied to living individuals. There can be little doubt that in a democratic environment like ours the only solution is that sovereignty must be mollified by the categorical imperative.

KARL LOEWENSTEIN

Shorter Notices

THE CRUISE OF THE RAIDER WOLF. By Roy Alexander. Yale University Press. $2.75.

There is a grim topicality about this story of the exploits of the most daring German commerce raider of the last war. The Wolf was a large freighter equipped with carefully concealed guns and torpedo tubes and carrying a big load of mines. Slipping through the North Sea blockade one foggy November she made her way into the Indian Ocean and for nearly a year cruised Eastern waters sowing mines at strategic points. She could touch at no point without giving away her secrets, and so was solely dependent for food and fuel on the ships she could capture, loot, and sink. Their crews and passengers were transferred to the Wolf's hold, which gradually became horribly overcrowded. Among the prisoners was the author of this book, who was radio operator on a British steamer seized off the New Zealand coast. Writing in a straightforward fashion with no literary flourishes, he has contrived to do justice both to the sufferings of himself and his fellow-prisoners and to the really amazing feats of their captors. For the commander of the Wolf, Captain Nerger, he has a boundless admiration and time after time pays tribute to the seamanship, resourcefulness, and determination which eventually brought the ship safely back to Kiel after logging 65,000 miles in thirteen months.

ANTHONY PHILIP HEINRICH. By William Treat Upton. Columbia University Press. $4.50.

Sonneck led the way to the rediscovery of Heinrich, and Professor Upton has completed the task of revivifying that strange American composer—he always considered himself American—who was rather accidentally uprooted from his native Bohemia and came here in the early eighteen hundreds to settle for a while in Philadelphia and in Lexington, where he began his ebullient career. This was to end in his being dubbed the American Beethoven but without other more substantial rewards. Professor Upton might perhaps have given us an explicit analysis of certain of the major compositions since he has studied the scores, but his general portrait of Heinrich as a composer and as a man is admirable, and he has succeeded well in the difficult art of including long excerpts from contemporary journals without the effect of merely slapping down the raw materials of research. As glimpses of contemporary musical criticism these excerpts are invaluable, lighting up the taste, the knowledge, the hesitations, the courage of early adventurers in a difficult field. Sonneck left behind him a wealth of suggestions for further study. The literature of American musicology will be rich indeed if they are developed as thoroughly and as sensitively as is this biography of Heinrich.

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DRAMA

THE holiday lull gives me opportunity to comment upon three new books about the theater, and by any standards —including both weightiness and weight—Professor Odell's eleventh volume (1879-82) comes first. As the series proceeds, fewer and fewer years can be included in each volume, but the undaunted author refuses to relax his standard of completeness, and we may still rest assured that no public entertainment provided anywhere in the metropolitan area will go unrecorded. One result is to give us the impression—false no doubt—that our frivolous fathers lived in a continuous round of gaiety, diverting themselves with contortionists or midgets or lectures on "What Our Girls Ought to Know" on the evenings when they were not attending performances of "Hamlet" by Lawrence Barrett or admiring the sensational new beauty, Lillian Russell, in one of the productions of "Patience."

Professor Odell's work has been called—correctly I think —the most extensive contribution to the history of the theater ever made by any one man, and nearly everything which can be said in praise of it has been said on previous occasions. The present volume contains 649 pages of text, plus an apparently impeccable index of more than 100 pages and approximately 350 illustrations. Certainly no one alive in 1882 was in possession of as much information about the contemporary stage as is here available to anyone who can use an index. But most remarkable of all is a fact which the reader is every now and then startled to realize—namely, that an amazing number of the hundreds of persons referred to are not, to the author, merely names. They are individuals whose talents and histories he either remembers or, as was of course always the case in the earlier volumes, has reconstructed from the record.

In a recent review Walter Prichard Eaton remarked that a scholar who could perform such a prodigious labor would certainly not object to another little task, and suggested a series of maps showing the location of the various places of amusement referred to. I am emboldened to make a considerably less modest request—namely, that Professor Odell should also give us in a separate volume his personal recollections of the stage. The "Annals" are themselves by no means wholly impersonal, but the scheme excludes any considerable amount of reminiscence, and he could recreate as probably no one else could the atmosphere of a theater which is separated from us by more than mere time. The rise of our own "new drama" meant the death of an old theater. Probably no one today goes to a theatrical performance expecting or getting just the kind of pleasure which playgoers expected and got in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It is evident that Professor Odell remembers all this with extraordinary vividness and particularity. A great many people would like to have him share his memories.

George Jean Nathan resembles Professor Odell in one—and probably only one—respect: he too has an encyclopedic knowledge of the theater and probably remembers in detail more plays and players of the last thirty-five or forty years than anyone else now writing. For that reason there is a subtle justification for the title of his latest volume, even though that volume is not what one would at first expect, the book being as a matter of fact a collection of short pieces on a great variety of subjects arranged alphabetically by title. At this late date there is no point in describing either Mr. Nathan's attitude or his style, both of which are as well known as those of any writer on our theater are ever likely to be. He lays about him with all his accustomed vigor, but the secret of his individuality is simply that, for all his cynicism, he has an abiding respect for the theater and that, for all his "sophistication," his deepest liking is for the most substantial things which the theater has to offer. Many years ago when for the first time I reviewed one of his books I called Mr. Nathan "little better than a highbrow," and that description will have to stand. No one is less often taken in, but no one is less likely to respond to the genuine with conventional flippancy. There is a great deal of good reading in the present volume, and it is hard to single out for comment individual pieces from such a varied assortment; but since Mr. Nathan's encyclopedic memory makes him a dangerous man to face with a generalization I suggest the article Morgan as a fine specimen of confutation by example and Everyman His Own Critic as an equally fine example of what the author can do in the way of collecting dramatic clichés.

"Annals of the New York Stage." By George C. D. Odell. Vol. XI. Columbia University Press. $8.75.

"Encyclopædia of the Theater." By George Jean Nathan. Alfred A. Knopf. $3.

"The Theater Handbook and Digest of Plays." Edited by Bernard Sobel. Crown Publishers. $3.

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Mr. Sobel's "Handbook" is exactly what its full title suggests and should prove extremely useful despite the fact that it is not clear just what principles of inclusion and exclusion were adopted in compiling a 900-page encyclopedia of the theater of all time. There are brief synopses of nearly a thousand plays, brief biographies of hundreds of actors, playwrights, critics, and managers, as well as definitions of technical terms and many bits of curious lore. Probably, however, there is nothing that one can be quite sure of finding. I note for example, that Frank Harris and Sam Harris are here, but that Jed Harris is not; that Mrs. Malaprop is included, but Mrs. Grundy and the gay Lothario left out; that Thomas Rymer is given five lines while William Hazlitt is omitted entirely. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of information, including an excellent bibliography contributed by George Freedley, and the book has real usefulness.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

RECORDS

THIS column has its own little In the Wind department in which, with some compunctions, I record Vladimir Horowitz's statement to an interviewer that in recent years "the later Beethoven sonatas have drawn me very much, though I would seldom try to play them in public, since the musical thought, partly on account of Beethoven's bad piano writing, remains inaccessible to the majority of listeners." My compunctions are caused by the fact that while the statement is in all ways ridiculous the man who made it is not: describing the development of his taste he confessed it had taken him a long time to get from Grieg, who had captivated him at the start, to Beethoven, and added: "But one must develop in one's own way, without apologies and certainly without the attempt at taking an artificial position, and claiming to admire what one does not." This honesty increases one's respect for Horowitz as a man, but it does not lessen one's concern over his effect as a concert pianist. All over the country, that is, are people whose only contact with music for the piano is made at recitals which are given almost entirely by pianists like Horowitz, functioning on a high level of virtuosity and a considerably lower level of musical understanding and taste; and for these people the greatest works of Beethoven, Schubert, Mozart, Haydn, and Bach might as well not have been written. And this is not to consider what idea they would get of the last sonatas of Beethoven from performances by someone with Horowitz's idea of them.

With no compunctions I report the way some of the German conductors you never heard of, who are now in this country, listen to a Toscanini broadcast, beating time and exclaiming now "*So* he does it?" and now "*This* tempo he takes here?" and once in a great while "*That* was good"—the verdict in the end being that Toscanini can do justice to Rossini and Verdi but not to German music, and above all not to Beethoven (for an eminent German musicologist who heard the broadcasts of the Seventh and Ninth only the Trio of the Scherzo of the Ninth was rightly understood by Toscanini). Inevitably these men appeal to an American to explain attitudes of the American public which they can account for only by dark conspiracies of American critics: the inflation into a twentieth-century Beethoven of a composer, Sibelius, in whose symphonies they cannot hear one phrase worthy of being called a theme; and the lack of appreciation of the genius of Bruckner. Evidently the Teutonic mind that is impressed by mere aspiration to profundity when this is expressed in sufficiently bulky and ponderous terms is a mind incapable of perceiving the modest pleasures—of thematic material and formal construction—which Sibelius does offer; and it is a mind that will hear injustice to Beethoven in Toscanini's performances.

Being myself bored by Bruckner's attempts at profundity, and the more bored the more bulky and ponderous the terms, I have had no enjoyment from the fourteen sides of Victor's set of his Ninth Symphony, recorded by the excellent Munich Philharmonic under Hausegger (M-627, $14). Nor have I had more enjoyment from Shostakovich's Symphony No. 5, which is more fluent and slick but in its own way as pretentious and as empty and arid in its pretentiousness—and what that way is I will have to postpone to another time. The work is gorgeously recorded by Stokowski with the Philadelphia Orchestra (M-619, $12).

After these I have had all the more pleasure from the first of the two volumes of Chopin's Mazurkas recorded by Artur Rubinstein. The genre is one in which Chopin and Rubinstein are at their best; and in this set (M-626, $10) nearly all the examples are fine, and some—such as Opus 6 No. 2, Opus 17 No. 4, Opus 41 No. 2—are among the finest. There has been pleasure also from Mozart's Violin Concerto K. 218 in a performance by Kreisler with the London Philharmonic under Sargent (M-623, $6.50), in which Kreisler's tone is silken, his technique and intonation clean, his phrasing simple and in good taste; but there are more vitality and sparkle and style in the performance, excellently recorded four years ago, of Szigeti and the same orchestra under Beecham. In the same way Koussevitzky's performance of Beethoven's Second Symphony with the Boston Symphony Orchestra (M-625, $7) is excellent, but I like even better what Beecham makes of the work; and in this instance the Boston performance is less successfully recorded: one hears reverberation at times which may be what at other times coarsens the sound of an orchestra that is outstanding for the refinement of its sonorities. That has been true of other Boston recordings. On the other hand, the sound of the Philadelphia Orchestra under Stokowski is beautifully reproduced, as usual, in the single record (15800, $2) of the Magic Fire music from "Die Walküre." Other January releases next time.

There is still a December set to report on—the beautiful Concerto Grosso in G minor of Corelli, excellently recorded by Bruno Walter with the London Symphony (M-600, $3.50). As for the December releases of Strauss's "Ein Heldenleben" and Haydn's Symphony No. 104, and the special releases of Act 3 of "Die Meistersinger," Lehmann's set of Wolf songs, Landowska's set of Handel suites—they are of the highest importance, and those readers who are interested in what I think of them may be more successful in persuading Victor to send them to me than I have been. To hear that many records in a shop is something not easily managed by the shop or myself.

B. H. HAGGIN

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Letters to the Editors

Socialism in the U. S. S. R.

Dear Sirs: The appearance of such an article as Alan Mather's Militarism versus Socialism in the U. S. S. R. in *The Nation* (December 16) must set thousands of *Nation* readers wondering—wondering about many other things now appearing in *The Nation,* on subjects other than those covered by the article. Reference to the back files of the magazine will convince any reader that it is a type of article that would not have been printed four months ago, though the facts on which Mr. Mather bases his conclusions are supposedly three or four years old. I do not mean to imply that no rabid attacks on the Soviet Union appeared in *The Nation* before the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. Such attacks, however, were always of an ideological character and usually dealt with imponderables not capable of prima facie proof or disproof. In articles dealing with such factual matters as Mr. Mather's article purports to deal with, the editors of *The Nation,* in the past, have seen to it that the author observed the amenities of scientific research and have permitted no unsupported statement and no unverified figures to appear in its columns.

Mr. Mather's thesis is that since 1934 factors which the internationalists [Trotskyists?] had predicted have prevented the development of Russian economy into socialism. The factors to which he refers are inherent in the militarization of the Soviet Union, which has led to a supposed stasis of Soviet production. Even the old "nationalization-of-women" gag is revived—Mr. Mather cites the increased Russian birth rate of the last few years as a military measure which is preventing socialism by withdrawing women from industry. To support this thesis Mr. Mather declares that "the output of coal, pig iron, steel ingots, and rolled steel flattened out to an almost dead level in 1936, 1937, and 1938." Furthermore, he insinuates that Soviet statistics are deliberately falsified. "Industrial production," he says, "measured in tons, gallons, and other physical quantities, not in rubles as Soviet officials are so shrewdly measuring it these days, has been leveling off in the last three years," the inference being that an inflated ruble explains whatever current production increases may be claimed.

Nowhere does Mr. Mather cite the comparative production figures for the three-year period he mentions, 1935 to 1938. Here are the figures, *not in rubles, but in very physical tons.* In 1935 coal production was 109,000,000; in 1938, 133,000,000. In 1935 pig iron was 12,500,000; in 1938, 15,000,000. In 1935 steel was 12,600,000; in 1938 it was 18,000,000. In 1935 oil was 26,900,000; in 1938 it was 32,000,000. Certainly this does not read like a flat level.

Moreover, if Mr. Mather had ever looked at a Soviet statistical chart in which production is given in rubles he could not have failed to notice that in parentheses appears always the following statement—"in rubles, prices of 1926-27"; in other words, in the prices contemporaneous with the initiation of the Five-Year Plan. If a ton of steel was priced at ten rubles in 1927, it remained at ten rubles in 1938 statistics, thereby insuring that financial figures were strictly correlated with figures of weight and volume.

Either Mr. Mather accepts Soviet statistics as veracious, including their calculation of values of production in fixed prices of 1926-27, or he does not. If he does not he has no criterion of production to go by, and there is no use discussing the increase or decrease of Soviet production or basing any theories on it. But if he is looking for figures on the success or failure of socialism in the Soviet Union he might look up page 412 of the bound volume of the reports of the eighteenth congress of the C. P. S. U. "The Socialist system of production," says one of the reports, "has come to exercise undivided rule in the economy of the U. S. S. R. In 1937 it comprised 99.8 per cent of the gross production of industry and 98.6 per cent of the gross output of agriculture." From these percentages it would seem that the curve of socialism can hardly go very much higher in the Soviet Union.

ALTER BRODY

New York, January 2

Dear Sirs: In regard to Alter Brody's letter, that which is written on page 412 of The Book means that about 99 per cent of production in the Soviet Union came from farms and factories which had been labeled "socialist." But socialism, an economy superior to capitalism, is founded upon distributed material wealth—not upon speeches in congresses. The curve of socialism has only started to rise in the Soviet Union. Its progress awaits events in other countries.

Just as in my article I made a distinction between Stakhanov's work and the Communist Party's "Stakhanovism," or speed-up, so I accept Soviet statistics and reject the "clarifications" of them by Communist Party and Soviet officials. Sometimes the officials quote values in fixed prices of 1926-27, sometimes they don't. It was to protect readers against the times that they don't that I advised the use of weight and volume measurement. To reject falsification of statistics does not mean to reject statistics. I don't say that the officials are congenital liars. I say they can't afford to tell the truth.

Sure, production of coal, iron, and steel were so much in 1935 and so much more in 1938. So what? Of the net increase in steel production between the end of 1935 and the end of 1938, seven-tenths was made in 1936, two-tenths in 1937, and one-tenth in 1938. That's what I meant by leveling off. Coal and pig-iron production have the same unhappy profile. In the article I was concerned with a flattening production *rate* and a rising birth *rate.* Forget the absolutes, compare the rates!

I see by Alter Brody's letter that I said that socialism in the U. S. S. R. has failed because women there are nationalized and have too many babies. Or is that an exaggeration of an exaggeration? Finally, if I had meant Trotskyists I would have said Trotskyists. I said internationalists and I quoted Lenin. Was Lenin a Trotskyist? I'm no expert on sects. But maybe Lenin was a centrist, Bukharinite wrecker disguising rightist or fifth-column policies with left Trotskyist phrase-mongering.

ALAN MATHER

New York, January 9

Rivera's Fantasies

Dear Sirs: In Mexico, Diego Rivera's unchallenged place as public clown no. 1 has long overshadowed his fame abroad as his country's foremost painter. Consequently, his grotesque list of the G. P. U.'s Mexican agents, recently published in the American press, has been discounted here, by a public well inoculated against his noisy vagaries, as nothing but a characteristic bid for free

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headlines. This impression is fortified by Rivera's remarkable discovery of a sinister representative of the Cheka in the person of Harry Skipsey, a prominent and eminently conservative English banker who has been in business here for some thirty years.

However, as there may still be in the United States some persons gullible enough to be impressed by Rivera's irresponsible fantasies, and as he did me the honor of including me in his list, I should like the opportunity to advise them against uncritical acceptance of "denunciations" whose sole purpose is publicity for their inventor. The incident is without importance save as an illustration of the latest and most depressing phase in the degeneration of Diego Rivera. HARRY BLOCK

Mexico City, December 11

First a Spaniard and a Liberal

Dear Sirs: May I take issue with Leigh White's inadequate review of Constancia de la Mora's "In Place of Splendor" which appeared in your issue of December 23.

Mr. White criticizes the book on three counts—because the first part is more interesting than the last, because it is not a "candid account of a Spanish government worker in the war," because, or so he claims, its last half follows the Communist Party line.

On the first and second counts the fault lies surely with Mr. White. To complain because the vivid autobiography of an intelligent and high-spirited rebel against the old, hard crust of Spain is not a critical account of the conduct of the war is to misunderstand the fundamentals of a reviewer's task. In claiming that Miss de la Mora follows the Communist line when she relates what came under her personal observation and what she heard, is Mr. White quite sure that he is not following the line of another and a competing party? This book breathes on every page the spirit of "some of which I was, all of which I saw."

As any number of us who knew Spain long before 1936 have tried to explain, the line which the Communist Party adopted there was in many respects similar to that which intelligent Spanish liberals had been advocating for years. Constancia de la Mora was first of all a Spaniard and a liberal. Whatever her later party affiliations may have been they never weakened the force of those primary allegiances.

And by the same token she was quite capable of making her own estimate of government officials. Other people who by no stretch of anyone's imagination could be called disciples of Moscow have found Caballero inadequate, considered Prieto an inflated politician whose bilious temperament affected his judgment. Nor must one be following any party line in order to find Negrín intelligent, effective, and deserving of loyal support.

It is regrettable that avowed friends of liberalism like Mr. White should continue to obscure the main struggle between liberal and reactionary Spain by raising clouds of factional dust. What he seems in some strange way estopped from understanding is that Miss de la Mora's book, in picturing with such warmth and spirit the life of a girl growing up in the ruling circles of Spain, is making comprehensible that main struggle to hundreds of Americans who have never understood it, and is winning such friends for the defeated Spanish Republic as might have changed the whole American attitude toward the conflict had it been published in 1936.

MILDRED ADAMS

New York, January 1

The Ideal Newspaper

Dear Sirs: Professor Lerner's proposals for remedying the abuses of the press (see *The Nation* for November 4 and 11) are hardly practicable. Yet something should be done. May a retired newspaperman with nearly fifty years' varied experience in journalism behind him venture a suggestion?

It is surely not out of the question to establish an independent, non-partisan, intelligent, and comprehensive daily paper in, say, Washington, and make it truly national. Would not such a paper soon command a large circulation? Would not liberals, wage-workers, thoughtful persons generally welcome and support a daily that was fair to all groups, that suppressed no news fit to print, that opened its columns to all points of view?

The editorials, the book reviews, the dramatic and music criticism, the special essays, and other such features could be syndicated. The paper would need, perhaps, half a dozen correspondents in Europe and Asia. But it would also need local pages—a Chicago page, a Boston page, a Denver page, a San Francisco page. A well-edited daily of ten or twelve pages would meet all reasonable requirements. There is too much padding, too much repetition in our "big" dailies.

At five cents a copy such a daily should before long pay expenses. But for a time it would need subsidies and gifts. I believe there are many men and women who, disgusted and discontented with the plutocratic and yellow papers, would cheerfully endow a progressive, enlightened, and decent newspaper. A small group of trained and competent newspapermen, plus a few generous financial backers at the start, should take the initiative and appeal for wide cooperation. The response to such an appeal would surprise them.

VICTOR S. YARROS

Winter Park, Fla., December, 29

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